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 THE UNEASY CASE FOR PATENT FEDERALISM 
ROGER ALLAN FORD∗  
 Nationwide uniformity is often considered an essential feature of the 
patent system, necessary to fulfill that system’s disclosure and incentive 
purposes. In the last few years, however, more than half the states have 
enacted laws that seek to disrupt this uniformity by making it harder for 
patent holders to enforce their patents. There is an easy case to be made 
against giving states greater authority over the patent system: doing so 
would threaten to disrupt the system’s balance between innovation 
incentives and a robust public domain and would permit rent seeking by 
states that disproportionately produce or consume innovation. 
 There is, nevertheless, an uneasy case that this particular form of 
patent federalism may be a good thing. The federal patent system has 
systemic flaws that lead to low-quality patents, nuisance patent litigation, 
and patent trolls exploiting asymmetric bargaining power. And efforts to 
address these flaws have faltered, or have had limited effects, due to public-
choice dynamics in the patent system, so the scope of patent protections has 
expanded over time without regard to the system’s purpose of encouraging 
innovation. 
 States may help address some of these problems not in spite of, but 
because of, their own flaws. States have their own public-choice dynamics 
that happen to offset some of the flaws of the federal system. State anti-
patent laws have been driven largely by small businesses and local small-
business groups, which, unlike most patent holders, have preexisting 
influence in state government. And the laws they have crafted using this 
influence are well-targeted to affect only the most troublesome patent cases: 
nuisance cases, cases asserting low-quality patents, and cases targeting end 
users. States pushing back with anti-patent laws, then, may represent an 
effective second-best solution to the problem of harmful patent assertions. 
Moreover, recognizing the dynamics that led to these laws may provide 
helpful insights in designing federal patent reforms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, thousands of small businesses began receiving demand 
letters claiming that if the companies used networked document 
scanners—scanners that send scanned documents to users via email, or 
that upload them to servers—they were committing patent 
infringement.1 The letters came at first from a company called Project 
Paperless LLC, and later from an alphabet soup of companies with 
names like AccNum, LLC; AllLed, LLC; AdzPro, LLC; CalNeb, 
LLC; and ChaPac, LLC, all of which turned out to be subsidiaries of 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Mike Masnick, Patent Troll Shell Companies Shake Down 
Small Businesses for $1k Per Employee for Using Network Scanner, TECHDIRT (Jan. 2, 
2013, 1:34 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130102/08174721543/patent-
troll-shell-companies-shake-down-small-businesses-1k-per-employee-using-network-
scanner.shtml [https://perma.cc/W58C-T2L5]; Joe Mullin, Patent Trolls Want 
$1,000—for Using Scanners: An Alphabet Soup of Patent Trolls is Threatening End 
Users with Lawsuits, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 2, 2013, 8:30 AM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/ 01/patent-trolls-want-1000-for-using-scanners/ 
[https://perma.cc/XM5F-R9KV]. 
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MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC (MPHJ).2 The letters demanded 
$1,000 per employee for infringement of four patents with titles like 
“Distributed computer architecture and process for document 
management.”3 Notably, even though common scanning systems from 
companies like Canon and Xerox offer the allegedly patented features 
as standard features, the demands did not go to those companies, or 
even to large companies using scanners; they went after 16,465 small 
businesses instead.4 
As a matter of patent law, the companies that issued these demand 
letters probably did nothing wrong.5 They really did own the described 
patents, which had been issued by the Patent and Trademark Office. 
The patents plausibly appeared to cover the scanning setups described 
in the letters; certainly courts have accepted less-plausible-sounding 
patent claims. The patents may have been invalid, either because they 
did not cover something novel or because the claimed inventions were 
obvious at the time they were invented, but under federal law, patents 
 
 2.  Mullin, supra note 1. 
 3.  Several representative letters are available at MPHJ Technologies, 
TROLLING EFFECTS, https://trollingeffects.org/patent-owner/mphj-technologies 
[https://perma.cc/TWY8-EJVR] (last visited Mar. 28, 2017). The patents are: Process 
and Architecture for Use on Stand-alone Machine and in Distributed Computer 
Architecture for Client Server and/or Intranet and/or Internet Operating Environments, 
U.S. Patent No. 6,185,590 (issued Feb. 6, 2001); Distributed Computer Architecture 
and Process for Virtual Copying, U.S. Patent No. 6,771,381 (issued Aug. 3, 2004); 
Distributed Computer Architecture and Process for Virtual Copying, U.S. Patent No. 
7,477,410 (issued Jan. 13, 2009); and Distributed Computer Architecture and Process 
for Document Management, U.S. Patent No. 7,986,426 (issued July 26, 2011). 
 4.  See Alison Griswold, The FTC Has Settled with America’s Most 
Notorious Patent Troll, SLATE (Nov. 7, 2014, 9:21 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/ 
2014/11/07/ftc_patent_troll_settlement_mphj_charged_with_deceptive_sales_claims_an
d.html [https://perma.cc/R3QZ-YJNA]. Since the demand-letter campaign began, three 
makers of network scanners have obtained inter partes review by the Patent and 
Trademark Office of two MPHJ patents. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. MPHJ Tech. 
Invs., No. IPR2013-00309, at 2, 47 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 19, 2014) (finding 14 of 15 claims 
of U.S. Pat. No. 6,771,381 invalid); Ricoh Ams. Corp. v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., No. 
IPR2013-00302, at 2, 50–51 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 19, 2014) (finding 10 of 11 claims of 
U.S. Pat. No. 7,986,426 invalid). 
 5.  MPHJ did run into trouble with the Federal Trade Commission, though, 
which brought an enforcement action claiming that the demand letters were deceptive. 
See FTC Settlement Bars Patent Assertion Entity From Using Deceptive Tactics, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/ 
11/ftc-settlement-bars-patent-assertion-entity-using-deceptive [https://perma.cc/D5JH-
UZ44]. The claims were brought pursuant to Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). Complaint at 9, In re MPHJ Tech. Invs., No. 142 
3003 (F.T.C. 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/ 
141106mphjcmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/J83W-TMB4]. 
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are presumed valid until someone can prove otherwise.6 And although 
going after end users can be more expensive than going after companies 
that sell infringing systems, it is not improper, since infringement 
includes making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing a 
patented product or process.7 
And yet, the letters went viral to a degree that most stories about 
the patent system have not. One recipient started a public campaign 
against the patent holder, tracking down other recipients and fighting 
back when the patent holder sued.8 Other recipients went separately to 
the press.9 And members of Congress have pointed to the demand 
letters as a sign that Congress should enact patent reform.10 
The most unusual response came from the States. Although patent 
law is a matter of federal law, several state attorneys general got 
involved, targeting the companies under state consumer-protection 
laws.11 And state legislatures began passing laws that make it more 
difficult to enforce patent rights. Vermont enacted the first such law in 
2013;12 the law bans “bad faith assertion[s] of patent infringement”13 
 
 6.  See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid. . . . 
The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the 
party asserting such invalidity.”); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 564 U.S. 91, 91 (2011) 
(holding that invalidity must be proved by clear and convincing evidence). 
 7.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (defining direct patent infringement). For 
a discussion on patent litigation against end users, see Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the 
End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1443 (2014) (arguing that the patent 
system should give end users greater tools to assert their legal interests). 
 8.  Project Paperless promptly dropped the case. See Mullin, supra note 1. 
 9.  See, e.g., Paul Muschick, Feds Crack Down on Patent Trolling, 
MORNING CALL (Dec. 27, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://mcall.com/news/local/mc-patent-
trolls-mphj-watchdog-20141227-column.html [https://perma.cc/Z7GT-4Y3W]. 
 10.  See Joe Mullin, Troll Hunter: Meet the Oregon Lawmaker Who May Fix 
the Patent Mess: Rep. Peter DeFazio Took on the Issue After a Local Software 
Company Got Held Up, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 28, 2013, 7:00 AM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/02/troll-hunter-meet-the-oregon-lawmaker-
who-may-fix-the-patent-mess/ [https://perma.cc/7PTH-V4VK]. 
 11.  See Joe Mullin, Patent Troll that Wants $1,000 per Worker Gets Sued by 
Vermont A-G: Small State’s Action is the First Government Lawsuit Against a Patent 
Troll, ARS TECHNICA (May 22, 2013, 1:40 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/ 
2013/05/patent-troll-that-wants-1000-per-worker-gets-sued-by-vermont-a-g/ 
[https://perma.cc/68VZ-L8PX]; Joe Mullin, “Scanner Trolls” Kicked Out of 
Minnesota: Patent Troll Demanding $1,000 per Worker for Scanner Patents is in Slow 
Retreat, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 21, 2013, 7:15 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2013/08/ scanner-trolls-kicked-out-of-minnesota/ [https://perma.cc/CVZ5-
DGNU]; Joe Mullin, Second State Cracks Down on Patent-Wielding “Scanner Trolls”: 
Trolls Must Back Off Their Plan to Get “Fast Money” from Nebraskans, Says AG, ARS 
TECHNICA (July 23, 2013, 3:15 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2013/07/second-state-cracks-down-on-patent-wielding-scanner-trolls/ 
[https://perma.cc/93XS-AYRL].  
 12.  See generally VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195–4199 (2016). 
 13.  § 4197(a). 
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and gives recipients of demand letters the right to bring claims against 
the senders.14 The law does not define bad-faith patent assertions, 
though it provides courts with a list of eight nonexclusive factors courts 
can consider.15 Other states have followed: Between 2013 and August 
2016, thirty-one states have enacted laws seeking to reform patent 
litigation, mostly modeled on the Vermont legislation.16 
These laws are the most prominent recent example of patent 
federalism—efforts by the states to adopt their own patent policies. 
Although these examples involve anti-patent laws, patent federalism can 
take many forms, including laws designed to strengthen federal patent 
rights; laws designed to provide state complements or substitutes for 
federal patent rights, like state patent rights or trade-secret protections; 
and laws designed to provide non-patent innovation incentives, like tax 
credits or innovation prizes. 
There is an easy case to be made against giving states more 
influence over the patent system. For the patent system to work well, 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, uniform nationwide 
rules are key.17 Otherwise, individual states could upset the balance 
between encouraging innovation and protecting competition and a 
robust public domain.18 State laws that specifically target patent-holders 
and make it harder to exercise their patent rights are especially likely to 
upset this balance, since they directly undermine the incentives that 
patent law is designed to promote. State laws are also troublesome 
because they can represent an attempt by residents of that state to 
 
 14.  § 4199(b). 
 15.  § 4197(b). The factors include, for instance, whether a demand letter 
includes “factual allegations concerning the specific areas in which the target’s 
products, services, and technology infringe the patent or are covered by the claims in 
the patent,” § 4197(b)(1)(C); whether the sender has conducted “an analysis comparing 
the claims in the patent to the target’s products, services, and technology,” § 
4197(b)(2); and whether “[t]he demand letter demands payment of a license fee or 
response within an unreasonably short period of time,” § 4197(b)(4). 
 16.  See infra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 17.  See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 
162 (1989) (“One of the fundamental purposes behind the Patent and Copyright Clauses 
of the Constitution was to promote national uniformity in the realm of intellectual 
property. . . . This purpose is frustrated by the Florida scheme, which renders the 
status of the design and utilitarian ‘ideas’ embodied in the boat hulls it protects [at issue 
in the case] uncertain.”). But see Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patents as a Solution to 
Underinvestment in Innovation, 62 KAN. L. REV. 487, 488–89, 496–500 (2013); Lisa 
Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 85–87 (2015). 
 18.  See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 152 (“The tension between the 
desire to freely exploit the full potential of our inventive resources and the need to 
create an incentive to deploy those resources is constant. Where it is clear how the 
patent laws strike that balance in a particular circumstance, that is not a judgment the 
States may second-guess.”). 
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extract rents from outsiders, whether by strengthening or weakening 
patent rights. 
Still, there are reasons to think that this particular form of patent 
federalism may have benefits. The federal patent system has well-
recognized problems with low-quality patents and abusive assertions of 
patent rights that, in many cases, give patent holders the power to 
extract unearned rents. One result of these flaws is the rise of 
companies like MPHJ—the worst sorts of patent trolls—that contribute 
nothing to society other than nuisance lawsuits. State lawmakers are 
well suited to counteract some of these problems because, although 
states have their own problems, those problems tend to offset the flaws 
in the federal patent system. The parties that benefit from state anti-
patent laws are disproportionately the ones that are harmed by flaws in 
the patent system, while the parties that are harmed by state anti-patent 
laws are disproportionately the ones who benefit from flaws in the 
patent system. Patent trolls benefit from flaws in the patent system, 
while small businesses and customers are harmed by them; state anti-
patent laws have precisely the opposite effect. So, to the extent that the 
flaws in the federal system are real and cannot be fixed, state laws 
could help instead. 
To be sure, there are strong reasons to be wary of state lawmakers 
interfering in the patent system. If the particular mix of citizens in a 
given state would happen to benefit from stronger or weaker patent 
rights, that state’s lawmakers might enact laws designed to strengthen 
or weaken patent rights regardless of any havoc those laws would 
wreak on the nationwide patent system. Indeed, this sort of rent seeking 
by local interests seems inevitable when states start messing around in a 
national system. So state anti-patent laws may be less an affirmative 
good and more a least-bad way to reduce the effects of flaws in the 
patent system. 
But there are reasons to think the dangers of unleashing state 
lawmakers on the patent system might be less acute than they might 
seem to be. Though these laws could result in small businesses 
extracting some value that would otherwise flow to patent holders, they 
should have a minimal effect on the behavior of those businesses. Small 
businesses are unlikely to locate in specific states in response to these 
laws, since patent policy is far from the most salient consideration for 
the vast majority of small businesses. And patent holders have no real 
choice; a patent holder that wants to assert its patent against a defendant 
has no control over where that defendant is located. So these laws are 
unlikely to lead to a race to the bottom; their consequences would likely 
be limited to deterring the sorts of patent assertions that are 
troublesome in the first place. 
This Article has five parts. Part I surveys the rise of state anti-
patent laws and the broader context of federalist conceptions of the 
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patent system. Part II makes the easy normative case against patent 
federalism. Parts III and IV make the uneasy case for a limited patent 
federalism. Part III makes the substantive case, reviewing common 
critiques of the federal patent system and discussing how state laws can 
counteract the flaws highlighted by those critiques. Part IV makes the 
institutional case, explaining how the public-choice economics of the 
federal and state systems lead to the problems discussed in Part III. The 
upshot is that even though state laws are an especially inelegant way to 
target patent-holders, they may nevertheless be an effective second-best 
remedy for harmful patent assertions. Part V discusses implications for 
the greater patent system and the debate over patent reform. 
I. PATENT FEDERALISM 
Patent law is usually considered the province of the federal 
government. Although the colonies routinely granted patent-like rights 
before the Constitution was ratified, and a few states continued to do so 
into the early years of the United States, the last state patent was 
granted in 1798.19 This federal primacy is usually justified on 
uniformity grounds: only a single nationwide system can correctly 
balance society’s dual interests in promoting both innovation and 
competition, while minimizing compliance costs.20 Allow states to 
interfere, the theory goes, and the system tilts too far in favor of patent 
holders or competitors or becomes too costly. 
A necessary premise of this argument is that federal law strikes the 
right balance between these interests, such that state interference would 
be socially costly. Yet there are many reasons to think that is not the 
case; instead, complaints about the patent system have been common 
for years. The patent office grants too many patents to people who 
never really invented anything; patent lawsuits cost millions of dollars 
and take years to decide, allowing patent holders to hold up defendants 
for nuisance settlements; patent trolls who make nothing target 
defendants who make real products, raising the cost of those products; 
and so forth.21 And in response to these problems, scholars, patent 
 
 19.  See generally Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez 
Faire, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 47–80 (2013). 
 20.  See infra Part II. 
 21.  Citations to scholars criticizing aspects of the patent system could fill 
several volumes, even setting aside criticism by policymakers and others. For just a 
very small sampling of this criticism, see JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, 
PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT 
RISK (2008); MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL 
MONOPOLY (2010); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW 
THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND 
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lawyers, and policymakers have proposed numerous reforms, mostly 
designed to make it harder to obtain and enforce patent rights. Some of 
these reforms have become law, or are likely to become law soon.22 
Given these issues in the federal patent system, it is not surprising 
that states have also gotten into the act. This Part first describes the 
widespread recent adoption of state anti-patent laws and then considers 
whether federal patent law preempts these state laws.23 
A. The Rise of State Anti-Patent Laws 
Until recently, state policymakers played a limited role in the 
patent system. State attorneys general have occasionally targeted patent 
owners under state competition or consumer-protection laws,24 but 
otherwise, states have mostly stayed out of patent disputes. That 
changed in 2013, when states started enacting anti-patent laws. Since 
then, thirty-one states have enacted anti-patent legislation, with another 
eleven considering bills.25 
 
ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION 
AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004). 
 22.  The America Invents Act contained some measures designed to prevent 
abuses of the patent system, most notably including expanded post-grant opposition 
procedures and procedures for third parties to submit information for consideration by 
the Patent Office. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act § 6 (2011) (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–329 (2015)) (inter partes and post-grant review); § 8 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2015)) (information submissions by third 
parties); § 18 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2015)) (review of covered 
business-method patents). The proposed Innovation Act, which passed the House of 
Representatives in 2013, would go further, requiring plaintiffs to include specific 
technical details in infringement allegations and imposing fee shifting in patent cases. 
Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015–16). And there are signs Congress may 
soon consider a venue-reform provision in lieu of more comprehensive reform. See, 
e.g., Dennis Crouch, Law Professors Call for Patent Venue Reform, PATENTLYO (July 
13, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/07/professors-patent-reform.html 
[https://perma.cc/D26V-QYQ8]. 
 23.  This Article focuses on state efforts to change the substance of the patent 
system, through both substantive and procedural rules, but states could also try to insert 
themselves into the patent system by hearing patent cases in state courts. See, e.g., Paul 
R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 11. 
 24.  See, e.g., supra note 11. 
 25.  Patent Progress’s Guide to State Patent Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS 
(last updated Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-
guides/patent-progresss-guide-state-patent-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/QTD4-VCW4]. 
The enacted laws are ALA. CODE §§ 8-12A-1 to 8-12A-7 (2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 44-1421 to 44-1424 (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-12-101 to 6-12-104 
(2015); FLA. STAT. §§ 501.991 to 501.997 (2016); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-770 to 10-
1-774 (2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-1701 to 48-1708 (2015); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
505/2SSS (2015); IND. CODE §§ 24-11-1-1 to 24-11-5-2 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-
6,140 (2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:1428 (2015); ME. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 8701–8702 
(2015); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 11-1601 to 11-1605 (2015); H.B. 589, 113th 
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The state laws take three basic forms. The most common pattern is 
to ban “bad-faith” assertions of patent rights. For instance, Vermont’s 
law, the model for several of the laws, provides that “[a] person shall 
not make a bad faith assertion of patent infringement.”26 The law does 
not define bad-faith patent assertions, but it lists fourteen factors that 
courts may consider in deciding whether a defendant has made such a 
bad-faith assertion.27 The listed factors largely go to conduct outside of 
the courtroom. One factor, for instance, looks to whether the patent 
holder sent a demand letter that did not contain information like the 
patent number, the patent owner’s name and address, and specific 
infringement allegations.28 Another looks to whether the patent holder 
actually performed an infringement analysis before sending the letter.29 
Others go to the merits of the patent case, including whether the patent 
holder offered to license the patent for an unreasonable amount or 
whether the patent holder knew or should have known that the claim 
was meritless.30 And some factors go to the patent holder’s status: it 
weighs against a bad-faith finding when the patent holder is the original 
inventor or assignee, is an educational institution, or has made 
investments in its own products practicing the patented technology.31 
The law also provides for enforcement by the state attorney general,32 
or, in a private cause of action, by a target of a bad-faith patent 
assertion.33 Although this description is specific to Vermont law, most 
of the other state statutes have borrowed the basic approach. 
The second model for state laws is to ban false threats to bring a 
patent lawsuit. For instance, the Illinois statute makes it illegal to send 
a communication asserting that the recipient infringes a patent if that 
communication “falsely threatens that administrative or judicial relief 
 
Legis. Sess. (Miss. 2015) (not yet codified); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 416.650 to 416.658 
(2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-152 (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-M:1 to 
359-M:5 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-140 to 75-145 (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 
51-36-01 to 51-36-08 (2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, §§ 111–14 (2015); S.B. 1540, 77th 
Legis. Assemb. (Or. 2014) (to be codified as amended in OR. REV. STAT. § 646.608); 6 
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-41.1-1 to 6-41.1-6 (2016); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4-100 to 39-
4-150 (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 37-36-1 to 37-36-9 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§§ 29-10-101 to 29-10-104 (2015); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.952 (West 
2015); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-6-1901 to 78B-6-1905 (West 2015); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195–4199 (2016); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-215.1 to 59.1-215.4 
(2015); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.350.005 to 19.350.900 (2015); WIS. STAT. § 100.197 
(2015–16); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-1-201 to 40-1-205 (2016). 
 26.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197(a) (2016). 
 27.  § 4197(b)–(c). 
 28.  § 4197(b)(1). 
 29.  § 4197(b)(2). 
 30.  § 4197(b)(5)–(6). 
 31.  § 4197(c)(4)–(5). 
 32.  § 4199(a). 
 33.  § 4199(b).  
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will be sought if compensation is not paid or the infringement issue is 
not otherwise resolved.”34 This bans a technique used by MPHJ: 
sending demand letters that asserted that, if the recipient did not agree 
to a license within two weeks, a lawsuit would be filed. In most cases, 
no lawsuit came. 
The third model is to require demand letters to include specific 
information. For instance, the Illinois statute requires demand letters 
“inform an intended recipient or any affiliated person about the patent 
assertion” by including several specific pieces of information, like the 
sender’s identity, the patent number, and factual allegations explaining 
how the recipient allegedly infringes the patent.35 Similarly, the 
Wisconsin statute requires that demand letters contain several specific 
types of information, including the number of each asserted patent and 
specific asserted claims, a copy of each patent, an explanation of the 
sender’s infringement theory, and a list of every pending or completed 
court case or administrative proceeding concerning each asserted 
patent.36 
These provisions all follow the same basic strategy of regulating 
patent holders’ out-of-court behavior, in the form of demand letters and 
threats to bring infringement suits. The laws take this form for a few 
reasons. One reason is almost certainly to insulate the state laws, to 
whatever degree possible, from being preempted by federal patent 
law.37 But demand letters and litigation threats also give rise to 
substantive concerns that were particularly troubling to state 
lawmakers. As the Vermont attorney general testified, abusive demand 
letters can impose significant costs even when they represent empty 
threats.38 Because many, perhaps most, letters are never followed by 
litigation, they can be sent at essentially zero marginal cost. The cost of 
defending a patent lawsuit, however, can be millions of dollars even for 
a relatively low-stakes case. So there is little downside to sending many 
letters, even when the merits of the infringement claim would be weak; 
the asymmetric stakes and limited legal knowledge of many recipients 
create strong incentives to pay up. And because demand letters are not 
public documents, it can be hard to detect new letter-writing campaigns 
or campaigns relying on false or misleading statements. Finally, though 
federal courts and lawmakers have made progress toward reform in 
 
 34.  815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2SSS(b)(1) (2015). 
 35.  505/2SSS(b)(4). 
 36.  WIS. STAT. § 100.197(2)(a) (2015–16) 
 37.  See infra Part I.A. 
 38.  Trolling for a Solution: Ending Abusive Patent Demand Letters: Hearing 
Before the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., & 
Trade, 113th Cong. (Apr. 8, 2014) (statement of William H. Sorrell, Att’y Gen. of 
Vt.), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg90884/html/CHRG-
113hhrg90884.htm [https://perma.cc/QPM9-292C]. 
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many areas of patent practice,39 they have not taken on abusive demand 
letters, leaving room for a state role. 
Given these facts, it is unsurprising that states became involved. 
And yet, in the short time they have been in force, these laws have had 
little practical effect. Few cases have been brought under them.40 And 
though it is possible that they deterred patent holders from enforcing 
patent claims against residents of the enacting states, these laws have 
not led to any significant decline in patent litigation brought in those 
states.41 Still, it may be too early to see results; if the laws ever have 
the effects they were designed to have, it is worth considering whether 
those effects are desirable. 
B. State Anti-Patent Laws and Federal Preemption 
Patent law is usually thought of as an exclusive creature of federal 
law.42 Patent law gets its own title (Title 35) of the United States Code, 
and federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases arising 
under federal patent law.43 Moreover, as discussed below, the Supreme 
Court has held that states are prohibited from creating their own patent-
like rights because they would upset the balance struck by federal 
patent law. So there is a strong argument that anti-patent laws are 
preempted: although they create no new patent-like rights, they would 
interfere with this balance in the opposite direction, undermining the 
innovation incentives created by patent law. But the argument is not air-
tight; notably, the Supreme Court’s patent-preemption case law almost 
 
 39.  For citations on legislative reforms, see supra note 22. Judicially, the 
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have decided numerous cases since 2005 in 
ways that narrow patent scope, make it harder to bring abusive patent claims, or 
otherwise tighten patent standards. See, e.g., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. 
Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 
(2014); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 
U.S. 398 (2007); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Phillips v. 
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also Mark A. Lemley, The 
Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2016). 
 40.  The State of Vermont sued MPHJ under that state’s law, and a North 
Carolina company asserted a counterclaim under that state’s law after getting sued for 
patent infringement. See Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., No. 282-5-13 Wncv, 2014 WL 
5795264 at *4 (Vt. Super. Aug. 28, 2014) (denying MPHJ’s motion to dismiss for lack 
of personal jurisdiction); Complaint, Cirrex Systems, LLC v. Sumitomo Electric 
Lightwave Corp., No. 120140924211523, 2014 WL 4999353 (D. Del. Sept. 24, 2014); 
Jason D. Gardner & Stephen J. E. Dew, North Carolina Abusive Patent Assertions Act: 
A Powerful Gun, but Will It Hold Up in a Gunfight?, 17 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 391, 416 
(2016). 
 41.  See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 39. 
 42.  E.g., Hrdy, supra note 19, at 47 (“Today patent law is purely a federal 
creature.”).  
 43.  28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012). 
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exclusively addresses laws granting rights on top of those granted by 
the patent system, not ones cutting back on federal patent rights.44 
Federal patent law preempts many state efforts to interfere with the 
patent system because those efforts undermine the goals of the federal 
scheme.45 As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, the patent 
system represents a compromise between competing goals. Patents 
solve a market failure: because it often costs much more to innovate 
and develop a new invention than it costs to copy that invention once it 
exists, society will under-invest in inventions absent some outside 
incentive to make those investments.46 Patents provide that incentive by 
giving an inventor a period of exclusivity, so she can charge monopoly 
prices and recover that initial investment. But this exclusivity imposes a 
cost: monopolists charge monopoly prices, so fewer consumers can 
afford to purchase the seller’s good.47 So when a patented drug costs 
 
 44.  Commentators have reached different conclusions on the likelihood that 
the state laws, or the Vermont law that launched the trend, would survive preemption 
analysis. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. L. REV. 1579, 
1631–35 (2015) (concluding that the Federal Circuit’s preemption case law “gives 
courts a clear path to find some of the new state statutes invalid and to limit the 
application of others”); David Lee Johnson, Note, Facing Down the Trolls: States 
Stumble on the Bridge to Patent-Assertion Regulation, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2023, 
2028 (2014) (concluding that “much of [Vermont’s] law is likely dead letter because it 
is preempted by federal patent law”); T. Christian Landreth, The Fight Against “Patent 
Trolls:” Will State Law Come to the Rescue?, 15 N.C.J.L. & TECH. ON. 100 (2014) 
(concluding that “Vermont has avoided preemption by tailoring its efforts to conform to 
federal guidelines”); Camilla A. Hrdy, The Reemergence of State Regulation of 
Patents, 89 Colo. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) (concluding that under Allen v. Riley, 
203 U.S. 347 (1906), states retain substantial power to regulate the assertion of federal 
patent rights). 
 45.  This form of preemption arises when the state and federal law conflict, 
directly or indirectly. See generally Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67–74 (1941) 
(asking whether a state immigration law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 5.2 at 392–418 (4th ed. 2011); 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-28 at 1172–79 (3d ed. 
2000). Two other forms of preemption do not apply in patent law: express preemption, 
which applies when a statute contains an express preemption clause, and field 
preemption, which applies when Congress has enacted a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme designed to occupy fully a particular field, leaving no room for state laws. See 
generally Gugliuzza, supra note 44, at 1601–08. 
 46.  This is the standard utilitarian case for patent rights, and it is embodied in 
the Constitution itself. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have 
Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries”); Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 71, 77 n.18 (2013) (reviewing various economic explanations for the 
benefits of patent law). 
 47.  This reduced output is the standard explanation of the social cost of 
monopolies. See, e.g., Edwin G. West, Monopoly, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
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$440,000 for a year’s supply for one patient, that allows the inventor 
time to recover some of its development costs, but it also means that 
fewer patients can benefit from the invention.48 As a consequence, then, 
the patent monopoly must be carefully balanced; too strong a 
monopoly, and the social costs of the patent system outweigh its 
benefits. And uniform federal standards promote this balance: as the 
Supreme Court has explained, “the patent system is one in which 
uniform federal standards are carefully used to promote invention while 
at the same time preserving free competition.”49 
State laws can upend this balance in either direction. State laws 
that try to narrow exclusive rights, compared with the rights created by 
the federal patent system, reduce the innovation incentives by reducing 
the benefits created by the patent system. State consumer-protection 
laws that erect barriers to bringing patent claims, for instance, make it 
harder for patent holders to assert legitimate patent rights, reducing the 
value of those rights and, thus, reducing the ex ante incentive to invest 
in new inventions. On the other hand, state laws that try to expand 
exclusive rights beyond the limits of patent law impinge on the public’s 
right to use ideas from the public domain. But a robust public domain is 
one of the goals of the patent system, not some sort of loophole that 
must be closed, so these laws equally upset the patent system’s balance. 
This latter concern about narrowing the public domain has been 
key in several Supreme Court cases on the preemptive effect of patent 
law. For instance, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., the Court 
held that a state unfair-competition law could not be used against a 
company that sold knock-offs of a competitor’s lamp design, when the 
original lamp was unprotected by patent law.50 The Court explained that 
the patent system exists to solve an economic problem: “Patents are not 
given as favors, . . . but are meant to encourage invention by 
rewarding the inventor with the right, limited to a term of years fixed 
by the patent, to exclude others from the use of his invention.”51 But 
once that exclusivity has expired, the public’s interest takes over: “[I]n 
rewarding useful invention, the rights and welfare of the community 
must be fairly dealt with and effectually guarded. To that end the 
prerequisites to obtaining a patent are strictly observed, and when the 
patent has issued the limitations on its exercise are equally strictly 
 
 48.  See Matthew Herper, How a $440,000 Drug is Turning Alexion Into 




 49.  Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230–31 (1964). 
 50.  Id. at 232–33; see also Compco Corp. v. Day–Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 
U.S. 234, 238 (1964) (companion case). 
 51.  Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 229. 
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enforced.”52 And since the patent laws exist to promote both new 
innovations and a robust public domain, states cannot interfere with the 
balance Congress has struck between these competing objectives. This 
is true regardless of the specific means employed: “Just as a State 
cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, it cannot, under 
some other law, such as that forbidding unfair competition, give 
protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent 
laws.”53 
Twenty-five years later, the Court expressed many of the same 
concerns in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.54 In that 
case, the Court struck down a state law making it illegal to use specific 
techniques to copy the design of a boat hull, or to knowingly sell a boat 
made using those techniques.55 The Court observed that patent law 
“embodied a careful balance between the need to promote innovation 
and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are 
both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a 
competitive economy.”56 And the Court emphasized that both sides of 
the equation were equally important: while intellectual property 
provides important incentives to create new things, at the same time 
“the efficient operation of the federal patent system depends upon 
substantially free trade in publicly known, unpatented design and 
utilitarian conceptions.”57 State laws that interfered with this robust 
public domain would be just as great an obstacle to the objectives of 
patent law as would laws that interfered with patent rights in the first 
place.58 
The laws at issue in Sears, Roebuck & Co. and Bonito Boats 
created exclusivities that did not exist under federal law; the Court has 
not dealt with state laws seeking to interfere with exclusivities that are 
created by federal law. But it is likely that the Court’s reasoning would 
apply to those laws as well. If patent law is a careful balance between 
competing interests in encouraging innovation and encouraging a robust 
public domain, then state laws that diminish the precise tool federal law 
uses to encourage innovation—the grant of patent rights—are just as 
 
 52.  Id. at 230 (quotations and citations omitted). 
 53.  Id. at 231. 
 54.  489 U.S. 141, 167 (1989). 
 55.  Id. at 143–44. 
 56.  Id. at 146. 
 57.  Id. at 156. 
 58.  See id. at 156–57 (“A state law that substantially interferes with the 
enjoyment of an unpatented utilitarian or design conception which has been freely 
disclosed by its author to the public at large impermissibly contravenes the ultimate 
goal of public disclosure and use which is the centerpiece of federal patent policy.”). 
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harmful to that balance as laws that narrow the public domain.59 That 
alone may be enough to find the state anti-patent laws preempted by 
federal law. But they also interfere with federal patent in another way: 
by reducing the nationwide uniformity of that law. The Court has been 
especially concerned about laws that threaten uniformity, since the 
“inherently ephemeral nature of property in ideas [and the] great power 
such property has to cause harm to the competitive policies which 
underlay the federal patent laws” create a risk of rent seeking by locally 
important industries.60 
The best hope for upholding state anti-patent laws likely lies in the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,61 which 
upheld state trade-secrecy laws against a preemption challenge.62 Trade-
secrecy laws extend limited protections to trade secrets—information 
that derives economic value from its secrecy. Trade-secrecy laws 
potentially conflict with federal patent law because inventors can often 
choose whether to protect their inventions with patents, disclosing them 
to the world in exchange for limited exclusivities, or by choosing not to 
disclose and instead protecting them as trade secrets.63 The Court 
upheld the statutes. It reasoned, in part, that trade-secrecy law largely 
serves different purposes than patent law, working to encourage 
standards of commercial ethics and encouraging innovation, rather than 
encouraging the disclosure of new inventions to the public.64 But the 
most significant piece of the opinion analyzed the effect of trade-
 
 59.  But see Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics 
of Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959, 969 (1991) (“Preemption occurs when analysis of 
protection criteria reveals a direct conflict between state and federal patent law. The 
decisions, however, do not authorize courts to strike down state laws simply because 
they do not provide for optimally efficient results. . . . A state law which upsets the 
balance as actually struck by a federal statute (inefficient though it may be) cannot be 
immunized from attack by a court which purports to find it ‘efficient.’”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 60.  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162–63 
(1989) (citing Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 179 (1978)). 
 61.  416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
62.  Id. at 493. 
 63.  Since Kewanee Oil, both the federal government and nearly all states 
have adopted trade-secrecy laws. See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 
114-153, 130 Stat. 376; Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1.4 (1985) (defining “trade 
secret”); §§ 2–3 (providing for injunctive relief and damages when someone 
misappropriates a trade secret). 
 64.  This reasoning has been much criticized. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, 
Protection of Trade Secrets in Outer Space Activity: A Study in Federal Preemption, 23 
SETON HALL L. REV. 560, 623–26 (1993); Sharon K. Sandeen, Kewanee Revisited: 
Returning to First Principles of Intellectual Property Law to Determine the Issue of 
Federal Preemption, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 299, 312–13, 322 (2008); 
Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 
623, 636 (2013). But see Heald, supra note 59, at 974–82. 
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secrecy laws on those incentives to disclose inventions. The Court 
concluded that the effect was limited, since most trade secrets are either 
clearly not patentable inventions, in which case there is no tradeoff, or 
are of dubious patentability, in which case trade secrecy might actually 
help weed out invalid patents.65 The Court acknowledged that clearly 
patentable inventions present the greatest problem for trade-secrecy law 
since in those cases the tradeoff between patents and trade secrets is 
most likely to affect inventors’ behavior. The Court concluded, though, 
that because a patent provides a much greater reward than a trade 
secret, the effect on the incentives set up by the patent system would be 
minimal.66 
The Court’s reasoning can be criticized for relying on empirical 
assumptions without sufficient supporting data,67 but if its assumptions 
are correct, then state anti-patent laws might be safe. Those laws 
reduce the upside from patent protection, just like trade-secrecy laws 
do, but they do not upset the fundamental bargain underlying the patent 
system: an inventor who obtains a patent still gets a limited term of 
exclusivity in exchange for inventing something new and disclosing that 
invention to the world. Nor do they create new exclusivities rights or 
deprive the public of any public-domain knowledge, like the laws at 
issue in Sears and Bonito Boats. Instead, they tweak the costs of 
asserting patent rights, just like state unfair-competition laws or 
changes in civil procedure. 
The Supreme Court’s case law, then, can be read to suggest that 
state anti-patent laws either are or are not preempted by federal patent 
law. The Federal Circuit has taken a slightly different approach to 
resolving patent-law preemption issues, one under which the laws are 
more clearly in trouble. In a series of cases involving state tortious-
interference and unfair-competition laws, the Federal Circuit has held 
that state laws survive if and only if they require bad faith on the part 
of the patent holder.68 So, for instance, in Zenith Electronics Corp. v. 
 
 65.  Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 484–89. 
 66.  Id. at 489–91. 
 67.  Alternatively, perhaps the Court properly found that the state laws’ 
challengers failed to meet their burden to show that federal patent law was undermined. 
E.g., Heald, supra note 59, at 981. 
 68.  See, e.g., Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999); Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1322, 
1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1476–77 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). In an extensive analysis of the Federal Circuit’s cases, Paul 
Gugliuzza concluded that the Federal Circuit’s rule is better considered an extension of 
Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity than as a traditional preemption test. See 
Gugliuzza, supra note 44, at 1616–28; see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. 
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E.R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
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Exzec, Inc.,69 Exzec brought a counterclaim alleging that Zenith had 
falsely informed potential Exzec customers that its product infringed 
Zenith’s patents, so that the potential customers would purchase from 
Zenith instead.70 Under the Federal Circuit rule, this counterclaim 
could only survive if Exzec proved that Zenith’s assertions about its 
patents were made in bad faith, because under federal patent law, 
patent holders have a right to enforce their patent rights unless they 
have no good-faith reason to think those assertions could have merit.71 
At first glance, Vermont’s law and the state laws modeled on it 
look well designed to fit within this case law, since they purport to 
prohibit only patent assertions made in “bad faith.”72 The “bad faith” of 
the Federal Circuit’s preemption test, however, bears little resemblance 
to the “bad faith” of Vermont’s law. Under the Federal Circuit’s test, 
for a state-law tort to apply when a patent holder seeks to enforce her 
patent, the patent holder must engage in subjective bad faith and the 
underlying patent claim must be objectively baseless.73 No amount of 
bad behavior by a patent holder is, by itself, enough to qualify as unfair 
competition or tortious interference or any other state-law tort, so long 
as there is some reasonable basis for the patent claim. The Vermont 
law’s conception of bad faith is not so limited. Most of the factors that 
determine good faith have little to do with classic conceptions of bad 
faith, subjective or objective; instead, most go to whether the patent 
holder has provided the enforcement target with sufficient time and 
information to provide a reasonable response.74 A court might construe 
the law to require subjective and objective bad faith; indeed, the 
Federal Circuit’s cases suggest that this is required. But on the whole, 
the Vermont factors are directed to the problem Vermont was trying to 
solve—patent enforcement against small businesses and other vulnerable 
targets—rather than the problem bad-faith patent enforcement. 
Two major conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, 
since federal courts have almost uniformly struck down state laws 
seeking to expand patent protections, and since laws seeking to limit 
them are subject to many of the same attacks, there are strong 
arguments that state efforts to set patent policy are likely to be 
 
69.   182 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 70.  Id. at 1343. 
 71.  See Dow Chem., 139 F.3d at 1476. 
 72.  E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197(a) (2016) (“A person shall not make 
a bad faith assertion of patent infringement.”). Of course, not all the state anti-patent 
laws even purport to require bad faith. See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2SSS(b)(1) 
(2015); WIS. STAT. § 100.197 (2015–16). 
 73.  Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Comput. Grp., 362 F.3d 1367, 1374–
77 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 74.  See tit. 9, § 4197. 
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preempted. Second, at the same time, there is enough uncertainty in 
this outcome to give state laws some room to have an effect. 
II.  THE EASY CASE AGAINST PATENT FEDERALISM 
Since the conventional wisdom is that the patent system depends on 
uniformity, there must be good arguments against state involvement. 
This Part explains that case. Courts and policymakers have long 
assumed that uniformity is unusually important in patent law; indeed, 
this belief drove the creation of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit.75 Disrupting this uniformity would undermine the 
careful balance federal law strikes between encouraging innovation and 
competition. It would do so both by changing that balance directly and 
by increasing compliance costs. To be sure, these arguments are not 
airtight; indeed, they rely on several key assumptions that may be 
questionable. But they are strong enough that they should give state 
policymakers pause before they enact their own patent policies. 
First, as discussed above, and as the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
emphasized in its preemption decisions, state laws threaten to upset the 
delicate balance patent law strikes between competing goals: providing 
innovation incentives while also promoting competition and a robust 
public domain.76 While the Court has embraced this reasoning for 
doctrinal reasons, to demonstrate how state law can act as an obstacle 
to achieving patent law’s goals, it also demonstrates how state laws can 
be normatively problematic. If patent law provides the right balance of 
innovation and competition—and this is a big if, to which I will return 
later77—then state patent policies can only make things worse by 
hindering innovation incentives or competition.78 
Different state laws would have different effects on this balance. A 
state law that granted state-specific patent rights, for instance, would 
have a greater effect than one that imposed a small tax on companies 
licensing patent rights; both would create marginal innovation 
incentives, but the scale of those incentives would be quite different. 
The effect of a Vermont-style law on innovation incentives may be 
small. Such laws merely make certain specific enforcement actions 
 
 75.  See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. 
L.J. 1437, 1453–58 (2012) (recounting the history of the creation of the Federal 
Circuit). 
 76.  See supra notes 50–58 and accompanying text. 
 77.  See infra Part V. 
 78.  Again, it is worth emphasizing that this conclusion depends on the (rather 
dubious) assumption that the federal patent system strikes the optimal balance between 
innovation incentives and competition; if, instead, patent law over-weighted one factor 
or the other, then state laws upsetting the federal-law balance might be welfare-
enhancing. See infra note 82. 
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harder, rather than making it harder to enforce patents generally. And 
regardless, the effect of any one state’s law is necessary attenuated in a 
nation made up of fifty states. But if the law has any effect at all, it will 
necessarily be felt on the margins, with some investors deciding the 
benefits of patent protection are no longer great enough to make an 
investment worthwhile. And when multiple states enact similar laws, 
this effect is magnified. Given these effects, then, we can expect some 
inventions that would have been made under the uniform federal patent 
system—or, at least, some patents that would have been obtained under 
the uniform system—not to happen if the state anti-patent laws have any 
effect. This is the key social cost of such laws. 
Second, the nationwide uniformity of the patent system helps 
accomplish the patent system’s dual goals because it makes it easier for 
businesses to invest and rely on patent protections without having to 
navigate fifty different intellectual-property systems. Otherwise, the 
cost of complying with fifty state intellectual-property regimes, and 
optimizing business strategy consistent with those laws, would be 
prohibitive for many businesses. And the marginal cost of a state-
dependent patent system is likely to be high, since the cost of 
complying with multiple state laws will be disproportionately 
concentrated in precisely the businesses that are most reliant on 
intellectual property. This is so because businesses that invent new 
things and rely on patent protections are unlikely to limit their 
operations to one state; for one thing, such a business would be 
sacrificing the value of its patent rights attributable to the markets of 
the other forty-nine states (to say nothing of international markets). 
In a uniform federal patent system, even a small business can have 
a nationwide presence, because there are only a small number of 
activities required to monetize patent rights, and those activities are the 
same from state to state. A patent holder enforcing patent rights 
typically would send demand letters, negotiate license agreements, and 
file infringement lawsuits when necessary.79 But all those activities 
work the same no matter where the enforcement target is located; even 
the court system applies the same law, thanks to the Federal Circuit’s 
nationwide appellate jurisdiction.80 In contrast, when states impose their 
 
 79.  A patent holder usually need not provide any pre-suit notice, but doing so 
can often give the same outcome—money, in the form of payment for a license—at 
lower cost than filing a preemptive lawsuit. The exception arises when a patent holder 
sells a product embodying the patented invention but does not mark the product as 
patented; then, the patent holder must provide pre-suit notice or cannot collect 
infringement damages. See 28 U.S.C. § 287 (2012). 
 80.  See § 1295(a)(1) (vesting exclusive appellate jurisdiction in patent-
infringement cases in the Federal Circuit); see also § 1295(a)(4) (same, for 
administrative appeals from the Patent and Trademark Office). District courts do have 
local rules that vary from court to court, of course, but the effect of such variations is 
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own requirements on patent assertions, a patent holder must consider 
each state’s requirements separately. For instance, several state anti-
patent laws impose substantive requirements on the contents of demand 
letters;81 a patent holder engaging in a widespread enforcement 
campaign, then, would have to work to ensure, at considerable 
expense, that each demand letter complies with the relevant state’s 
laws. And if it is ever unclear which state law applies, or if multiple 
state laws could apply (for instance, if the state in which the sender is 
located imposes requirements on letters sent from that state, while the 
recipient’s state imposes different requirements on letters sent to that 
state), then choice-of-law and conflicts-of-law problems could 
complicate matters. 
Third, and most troubling, is the possibility of rent seeking, with 
state patent policies representing efforts by state lawmakers to enrich 
their constituents at the expense of out-of-state companies. This is 
possible because not all states are alike; some produce a 
disproportionate share of patentable innovation, while others 
disproportionately consume those innovations (in the form of licenses 
or innovative new products). If each state is able to set its own 
intellectual-property agenda, then states that disproportionately produce 
innovation should adopt disproportionately strong intellectual-property 
protections; states that disproportionately consume innovation should, 
likewise, adopt weaker protections.82 Patent holders in innovator states, 
then, would have less ability to enforce their patents against potential 
defendants in consumer states, because it would be more costly to do so 
and could subject them to liability. Likewise, potential defendants in 
consumer states would have greater ability to use patented technology 
without agreeing to license terms or risking a lawsuit. The result would 
be a wealth transfer from out-of-state patent holders to potential 
defendants in states that disproportionately consume innovation. And 
 
small in the grand scheme of patent litigation, a costly endeavor. See, e.g., REPORT OF 
THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N at I-153 (2011) 
(finding, in a survey of patent lawyers, that the median cost of litigating a patent case to 
final decision was $2.5 million when $1 million to $25 million was at stake and $5 
million when more than $25 million was at stake). 
 81.  See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 82.  This does not require assuming that strong intellectual-property 
protections lead to more innovation. Instead, the causation is the reverse: if innovators 
believe they would benefit from strong intellectual-property protections, then states with 
a disproportionately large number of innovators (who would, presumably, have 
disproportionately large political influence) should adopt stronger protections. 
Likewise, if consumers of innovation believe they would benefit from weaker 
protections, then states with more innovation consumers should adopt weaker 
protections. There could be second-order effects as well, for instance if an innovation-
consumer state enacted strong IP protections to encourage more innovations to 
consume. But these effects are likely to be much smaller than the first-order effects.  
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while this effect would be on the margins—patent holders would still 
bring some patent lawsuits in consumer states, and would undertake the 
effort in some cases to comply with heightened notice requirements—it 
could have a significant effect on marginal innovation. 
Indeed, there are reasons to think this effect could be greater than 
it seems, because selection effects could magnify the harm to 
innovation. If a random subset of states enacts anti-patent laws, then 
patent holders would face greater difficulties enforcing their patents 
against those customers who happen to be located in those states. This 
is an added cost, but one limited by the number of states that enact laws 
and the strength of those laws. However, if states that 
disproportionately consume patentable inventions are more likely to 
enact these laws, then the best markets for patent holders become more 
difficult to access. The effect on patent holders, then, is not merely 
proportional to the number of states that enact anti-patent laws, or the 
populations of those states; it is magnified by the degree to which states 
rent seek. 
To be sure, none of these arguments is without flaws. The 
Supreme Court’s preemption decisions are explicitly based on the 
premise that patent law strikes a careful balance between encouraging 
innovation and competition.83 But what if federal law has struck the 
wrong balance, or has done so using the wrong tools? 
In that case, state patent policies could have a welfare-enhancing 
role, because they could help correct the errors in federal patent law. 
They could do this in different ways. One possibility is direct: if federal 
law is tilted too far in the direction of innovation incentives at the 
expense of competition, or vice versa, then state laws limiting the scope 
or effect of patent rights might help undo this tilt.84 If the federal patent 
system is too protective of patent holders, then, state laws weakening 
federal patent rights would help move the overall legal system toward 
the optimal point. Indeed, Part III will argue that this is the case. 
Another possibility is indirect: if we are uncertain about patent 
law’s optimal balance, or about the best means of obtaining that optimal 
balance, then variation between state policies could help scholars and 
policymakers determine the best policies. Indeed, Lisa Ouellette has 
proposed that experimentalism in patent policy would help solve several 
hotly contested issues in patent law, including the basic questions of 
whether the marginal incentives that patents provide to innovate, 
commercialize new innovations, and disclose those innovations to the 
 
 83.  See supra notes 50–58 and accompanying text. 
 84.  E.g., Hrdy, supra note 17. 
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world are worth their tradeoffs.85 State patent policies would still cause 
problems: the increased legal costs for firms would be significant. But 
if they provide marginally valuable incentives, or valuable information 
about the best approach to those incentives, then those benefits might 
outweigh the costs. 
These points suggest that many of the strongest arguments in 
support of state patent policies are really arguments about the federal 
patent system. If the federal patent system is serving its intended 
purposes, then the arguments against state involvement present strong 
reasons to think that there would be little benefit to getting states 
involved. If the federal system has problems, though, or even just 
specific features that could be improved, then states could play a 
positive role. And this suggests that arguments in support of patent 
federalism must be rooted, to a significant degree, in criticisms of the 
federal patent system and must be tailored to address those criticisms. 
The next Part makes that case. 
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE CASE FOR LIMITED PATENT 
FEDERALISM 
If state patent laws suffer from the flaws described in the last Part, 
then the burden is high to justify state attempts to meddle in patent 
policy. This Part provides a substantive case for a limited form of 
patent federalism: Vermont-style laws that seek to make it harder to 
bring patent-infringement claims. This is concededly an outcome-driven 
argument, not one rooted in any principles of federalism. It stems from 
the premise that the federal patent system has not settled at the best 
balance between innovation and competition, or the best means of 
achieving that balance. Instead, it assumes, federal patent law is 
distorted in favor of patent holders and has chosen means that are too 
costly for accused infringers. If those premises are correct, then state 
anti-patent laws could help provide helpful reforms. 
There is a near-consensus that the federal patent system has 
problems. The Patent Office routinely grants invalid patents; patent 
trolls routinely bring nuisance cases asserting those invalid patents; and 
juries routinely hand out enormous damage awards to patent holders 
who never really invented anything, at the expense of companies 
developing successful products that really do benefit society. Or, at 
least, that is a common narrative; and while this narrative may be 
overstated, it contains some truth. States, in turn, can help restore the 
 
 85.  See Ouellette, supra note 17. To be sure, Ouellette concludes that 
experimentalism should come from centrally controlled randomized trials, not through 
unconstrained state-centered variation. 
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balance between innovation and competition by moving the broader 
system closer to the optimal point. 
A. The Flawed Federal Patent System 
Most patent scholars agree that the modern patent system does an 
imperfect job of encouraging innovation. This section highlights four 
common critiques: that the Patent Office grants low-quality patents; that 
patent holders bring nuisance lawsuits designed to extract settlements 
rather than enforce legitimate patent rights; that patent trolls and other 
nonpracticing entities bring cases against productive companies, 
extracting royalties for products that owe little or nothing to the 
patentees’ work; and that patent holders bring claims against end users 
and other defendants with low bargaining power. 
The goal of this section is not to show that these critiques are 
correct; rather, I take it as an assumption that they apply to the patent 
system, or at least to significant parts of that system. Rather, my aim is 
to highlight critiques that are especially relevant for state anti-patent 
laws. These are, of course, not the only criticisms of the patent 
system,86 but they are the ones that state anti-patent laws are designed 
to target and on which such laws are likely to have the greatest effect. 
1. THE PATENT-QUALITY CRITIQUE 
The patent system’s biggest problem may be patent quality, with 
examiners granting many problematic patents. These problems fall into 
various categories. Some patents cover inventions that are not actually 
new, or are not meaningfully different from what came before.87 Others 
claim inventions broader than what an inventor actually invented, or 
fail to inform practitioners how to make and use the claimed 
invention.88 Still others are vague about what they claim, or have claims 
that seem deliberately obfuscated or designed to be difficult to compare 
 
 86.  Other criticisms include both the broader, see, e.g., BOLDRIN & LEVINE, 
supra note 21 (arguing for the complete elimination of the patent and copyright 
systems); and the narrower, see, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 21 (arguing that the 
patent system should take greater account of differences from industry to industry). 
 87.  Such patents fail patent law’s novelty and nonobviousness requirements. 
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2012) (novelty and nonobviousness, respectively). Whether 
or not a patent satisfies these requirements is the most basic definition of patent quality. 
See generally Christi J. Guerrini, Defining Patent Quality, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091 
(2014); R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2135 (2009). 
 88.  Such patents may fail patent law’s written-description and enablement 
requirements. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 
F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
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to real-world products.89 These quality problems are surprising at first 
glance, since patent law is the only major form of intellectual property 
in which obtaining rights requires a detailed, substantive examination 
by an expert examiner.90 Yet there are several reasons quality problems 
persist. 
One set of factors stems from the examination process itself. 
Patent examination is an ex parte process, so examiners do not have the 
benefit of adversarial presentation by parties on both sides of a dispute; 
instead, they see only information and arguments tending to show that 
an applicant is entitled to a patent. Though examiners are supposed to 
conduct independent prior-art searches to overcome this limitation, they 
have limited time to do so. Examiners also have skewed incentives: 
they are rewarded (in productivity measures and bonuses) for granting 
patents and penalized (in increased workload) for rejecting patent 
applications. This stems from one of the stranger quirks of the United 
States patent system, under which an application can never be 
conclusively rejected by an examiner; instead, an applicant can always 
revive an application after rejection. So for examiners, the only certain 
way to get a file off one’s desk is to grant the application.91 
These examination limitations are compounded by applicants’ 
incentives to obtain vague patents claims. Applicants want to obtain 
patents as quickly and cheaply as possible while also ensuring that those 
patents will prove valuable; both goals can be furthered by writing 
vague claims. Vague claims can help an application move quickly 
through examination, since they can make it harder to find relevant 
prior art or to know if that prior art would invalidate the claims. And 
they help an applicant respond when an examiner issues a rejection, 
since vague claims can be twisted or interpreted flexibly to overcome 
whatever prior art an examiner does find. Vague claims are most 
valuable, though, after a patent is granted, since they can be asserted 
against a broader array of products and services, and since they can be 
interpreted after the fact to track industry developments. Patent law’s 
 
 89.  E.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 719, 757–67, 772–81 (2009); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 539, 552 (2009); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. 
REV. 709, 746 (2012). 
 90.  Both copyright and trademark law employ systems of examination and 
registration, but in neither case is that system a meaningful substantive limitation on 
rights. In the copyright system, rights arise the moment a work is fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression; registration is a formality, and examination simply assures that a 
registered work is among the categories of works eligible for protection. See 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 102(a), 408–411 (2012). And in the trademark system, registration provides 
benefits, such as constructive nationwide notice of a trademark holder’s claim, but a 
trademark can be protected whether or not it is ever registered. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 
1072, 1114(1), 1125(a) (2012). 
 91.  See generally Ford, supra note 46, at 87–91. 
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indefiniteness doctrine is designed to prevent applicants from obtaining 
overly vague claims, but in practice imposes minor obstacles.92 
There are also innocuous sources of low patent quality. Because 
patents by their very nature deal with the cutting edge, it may 
inherently be harder to precisely describe a new invention than 
something conventional, since terminology may not yet exist to describe 
the invention. And even when a patent originates in a longstanding 
field, words can rarely be stripped of all ambiguity; patent law has long 
assumed that language has inherent ambiguities that make it impossible 
to craft perfect patent claims, or at least that patent drafters have 
incentives to use such ambiguous language.93 
These patent-quality problems also feed into the nuisance-litigation 
and patent-troll critiques, discussed below, because they make it easier 
to obtain and enforce patent rights, even when those patent rights are 
undeserved or that enforcement is abusive. 
2. THE PATENT-TROLL CRITIQUE 
The most common, and most commonly debated, critique of the 
patent system in recent years is that it is overrun with patent trolls, or 
nonpracticing entities, or licensing firms—all names for firms that 
assert patent rights without making anything themselves. These firms 
are a problem, the critique goes, because they extract judgments or 
settlements from companies producing products without contributing 
any value to those products, or to society. 
To a significant degree, patent trolls may be symptoms of other 
problems in the patent system rather than a problem in their own 
right.94 For instance, they sometimes extract settlements by bringing 
nuisance litigation; then there is essentially no difference between the 
patent-troll critique and the nuisance-litigation critique addressed in the 
next section.95 Other times, trolls bring reasonably strong patent claims, 
 
 92.  See generally Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 
(2014). 
 93.  E.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 21, at 57; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. 
Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1743, 1745–46 (2009); Tun-Jen Chiang, Forcing Patent Claims, 113 MICH. L. 
REV. 513 (2015); Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 40 (2012). 
 94.  E.g., Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for 
the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2013). 
 95.  See, e.g., Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 461, 477 (2014) (noting “bottom feeder” trolls, which “make demands of many 
companies at once in order to get nuisance settlements”); David L. Schwartz, The Rise 
of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 370 (2012) 
(noting that lawyers at the “bottom” of the contingent-fee patent bar often represent 
non-practicing entities). 
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and the critique must be rooted elsewhere. One possibility is some sort 
of asymmetry between trolls and practicing entities, for instance 
because practicing entities face constraints that trolls do not.96 Another 
possibility is that trolls are more likely to engage in abusive tactics or 
behave in ways that reveal other flaws in the patent system.97 Yet the 
evidence is weak that trolls behave differently from other patent 
holders, at least in the aggregate; instead, they appear to get more 
attention for essentially the same behavior that other patent holders 
undertake.98 
Moreover, there are reasons to think that trolls can be socially 
beneficial. The troll label applies when a patent holder does not practice 
the claimed invention, but there is no reason to expect those who are 
good at inventing new technologies to also be good at commercializing 
those technologies. Just as specialization in the broader economy leads 
to gains from trade, patent trolls may efficiently separate invention 
from commercialization. Universities are the classic example: 
universities are very good at inventing new technologies, but they lack 
the expertise in operations, manufacturing, sales, and management to 
build those technologies into viable businesses. So they routinely 
license their intellectual property to others to commercialize, and they 
routinely assert those intellectual-property rights against non-
licensees.99 And the same story can be told about other non-practicing 
entities. When an inventor develops a new technology but fails to 
commercialize it, she may nevertheless have created significant 
potential value—value that may be realized when others succeed in 
commercializing the invention.100 
 
 96.  E.g., Lemley & Melamed, supra note 94, at 2129–46 (discussing the 
argument that trolls are uniquely unconstrained because they cannot be deterred by the 
threat of competitive responses, and concluding that the argument is unpersuasive). 
 97.  E.g., id. at 2146–66. 
 98.  E.g., id. at 2166–70. 
 99.  Though if universities are good at inventing new technologies, they may 
be surprisingly bad at monetizing those inventions. See Brian J. Love, Do University 
Patents Pay Off? Evidence from a Survey of University Inventors in Computer Science 
and Electrical Engineering, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 285 (2014). 
 100.  This story is significantly undercut, of course, when the successful 
commercializer is also an independent inventor; in that case, the unsuccessful first 
inventor really has contributed little to society. But the basic premise of the patent 
system is that rewarding the first inventor leads to greater innovation in the long run, 
both because it encourages earlier invention and because it leads to disclosure of new 
inventions. If this basic premise is true—and it is a fundamental and hotly contested 
premise—then the occasional failure is a necessary cost of the enterprise. 
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3. THE NUISANCE-LITIGATION CRITIQUE 
A variant of the patent-troll critique focuses on the most 
problematic troll behavior: bringing nuisance litigation that is designed 
to exploit litigation costs and asymmetric bargaining power to extract 
nuisance settlements. 
As I have discussed in previous work, a combination of features of 
the patent system encourages applicants to seek patents even when their 
primary value is nuisance value.101 Patent litigation is extraordinarily 
expensive—defending a case can cost hundreds of thousands or millions 
of dollars even in relatively simple cases.102 And because much of this 
cost comes from discovery, which can include wide-ranging discovery 
both into the technical details of the defendant’s products (for the merits 
of the patent case) and into the defendant’s sales, profitability, and 
licensing practices (for damages), it usually cannot be avoided through 
dismissal or summary judgment.103 So almost any patent lawsuit—
including even a nakedly unmeritorious suit—has a nuisance settlement 
value in the tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars; even such a 
settlement would cost far less than litigating the case.104 At the same 
time, in general, it can cost $20,000 to $30,000 to prosecute a patent 
application, far less than the nuisance settlement value of a typical 
patent.105 So it is worth getting even a low-quality patent, and given the 
 
 101.  See Roger Allan Ford, The Patent Spiral, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 841–
54 (2016). 
 102.  REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW 
ASS’N at I-153 to I-154 (2011) (reporting median costs of litigating patent cases, 
through trial, of $650,000 in cases with less than $1 million at stake and $5 million 
when more than $25 million was at stake). 
 103.  A notable exception to this arises when a patent fails to claim patentable 
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), district courts have granted 
numerous motions to dismiss patent cases after concluding that the asserted claims were 
directed to unpatentable abstract ideas. See, e.g., Michael D. Wilburn et al., Pretrial 
Dismissals and Judgments in Post-Alice Courts, ALSTON & BIRD LLP (Apr. 23, 2015), 
http://www.alston.com/publications/pretrial-dismissals-and-judgements-in-post-alice-
courts/ [https://perma.cc/FJV5-C54S]. With software patents and business-method 
patents, in particular, dismissal under Alice may prove to be a significant impediment to 
nuisance litigation. Id. But it is not a universal solution, since the patents that are likely 
to be vulnerable under the Alice test are almost entirely software patents and business-
method patents. Id. 
 104.  E.g., Schwartz, supra note 95, at 369–70 (“Often these lawyers [at the 
‘bottom’ of the contingent-fee market] will propose settlement amounts that are lower, 
often far lower, than the amount that it will cost an accused infringer to defend itself. . 
. . Sometimes the demands are as low as $5,000 or $10,000.”). 
 105.  See, e.g., David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual 
Property, 65 VAND. L. REV. 677, 689–90 (2012) (estimating that “an average patentee 
will spend approximately $22,000 to successfully prosecute a patent application”); 
Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
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quality problems discussed in the last subsection, it is readily possible 
to do so.106 
Empirical evidence suggests that nuisance litigation plays a role in 
the patent system, though it is hard to tell how significant that role is. 
One indicator that nuisance suits may represent a large fraction of 
patent cases is the number of cases that settle quickly, within 180 days 
of filing. Between 2000 and 2013, 33.3% of the 43,166 patent lawsuits 
filed were terminated in PACER within 180 days of filing.107 This is 
notable because six months is practically instantaneous in the time scale 
of high-stakes commercial litigation; patent cases that are resolved on 
the merits typically take two, three, or more years just to be resolved in 
the district court. So these quickly resolved cases generally represent 
settlements, walk-away agreements, or unilateral dismissals by 
plaintiffs. And the more quickly a case is settled, the more likely it is to 
be a nuisance settlement, since settlements that occur before significant 
discovery has taken place are more likely designed to avoid litigation 
costs and since the parties are less likely before discovery to have 
enough information to evaluate the merits of the case. The more cases 
that settle quickly, then, the more we should expect to see nuisance 
cases. 
Another indicator of the role that nuisance suits play in the patent 
system comes from surveys of frequent patent defendants. For instance, 
RPX Corp., a firm that buys patents to prevent them from being 
asserted against corporate clients, has found in surveys of its clients that 
more than half of lawsuits brought by non-practicing entities were 
settled within six months.108 And in another RPX study, this one of 
patent settlements, the firm found that attorney fees and litigation costs 
exceeded settlement payments in all but the most expensive category of 
cases.109 
 
1498 & n.13 (2001) (estimating that “the general range of costs for prosecuting a patent 
from start to finish . . . appears to be $10,000 to $30,000 per patent”). The total will 
vary from patent to patent depending on the invention’s complexity and other factors. 
 106.  I develop this point in greater detail in Ford, supra note 101. 
 107.  These numbers are calculated from a dataset provided by Lex Machina, 
which compiles information about intellectual-property litigation in federal courts. See 
LEX MACHINA, http://www.lexmachina.com/ [https://perma.cc/PE9V-GK2P] (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2017). I discuss this method at Ford, supra note 101, at 861–62. For 
information on the advantages of relying on Lex Machina, compared to other sources 
like LexisNexis, Westlaw, and PACER, see John R. Allison et al., Understanding the 
Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1772–73 (2014). 
 108.  2013 NPE LITIGATION REPORT, RPX CORP. at 37 (2014), http://www. 
rpxcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/RPX-2013-NPE-Litigation-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/72RQ-2MA8].  
 109.  2012 NPE COST STUDY: HIGH-LEVEL FINDINGS, RPX CORP. at 9 (2013), 
http://www.rpxcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/RPX’s-NPE-Cost-Study-results.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M7U7-QZXG]. 
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4. THE END-USER-LITIGATION CRITIQUE 
A related critique that has recently been made of the patent system 
is that it is too easy for patent holders to sue end users of a product 
rather than the company that makes and sells the product. Under 
American patent law, a patent holder has the choice of whom to sue, 
since making, using, selling, offering to sell, and importing a patent 
invention all constitute infringement.110 In the scanner-troll cases, for 
instance, the patent holders could have targeted the companies that 
made the scanners, or the stores that sold them; instead, they targeted 
the small businesses that used them to scan documents.111 As a matter 
of doctrine, there is nothing wrong with this; if the scanners embodied 
a patented invention, then using them is just as infringing as making 
and selling them would be.112 
Even though it is perfectly legal, we should still be wary of end-
user patent litigation because it should be less efficient than pursuing 
upstream manufacturers and sellers. If a patent holder has to sue 
thousands of small businesses that use networked scanners, for 
instance, that requires wasteful duplication of demand letters, complaint 
drafting, filing fees, and so forth. When a patent holder nevertheless 
elects to sue end users, we should ask why it is voluntarily taking on 
higher costs. And the likely answer is not good: suing end users 
suggests that the patent holder relies less on the underlying merits of 
the claim and more on asymmetric bargaining power to extract 
settlements. If the legal merits of the claim were strong, then a patent 
holder should be able to get the same damages suing the manufacturer 
as suing end users, since the usual measures of patent damages, lost 
profits and a reasonable royalty, generally scale linearly with the 
number of units sold.113 But if the goal is to use the threat of attorney 
fees to extract an early settlement, then measures that drive up those 
 
 110.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).  
 111.  This assumes that the scanner itself was alleged to infringe the applicable 
patent claims, since in that case the scanner would be the “patented invention” 
contemplated by the statute. Id. But the point is generally true even when the patent 
claim only covers the use of the machine, since in that case the manufacturer would 
commit contributory infringement or induced infringement. See id. §§ 271(b)–(c). 
 112.  And there are good reasons for this, since otherwise patent law would be 
rife with loopholes. Companies buying specialized equipment to use in manufacturing 
could escape liability by buying overseas; farmers replanting patented seeds would be 
immune from liability, see Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013); and end 
users would lack standing to challenge patent rights in court, see Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). These examples are 
discussed in Bernstein, supra note 7, at 1445–46. 
 113.  On patent damages, see generally 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012); Grain 
Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Products Co., 185 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978). 
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fees—like suing end users—work to a patent holder’s advantage. So 
does targeting defendants, like small businesses, who are more sensitive 
to those fees.114 And end-user defendants are likely to be easier targets 
for weak claims because they are often one-time players in the patent 
game and have less technical knowledge of the accused products or the 
asserted patents, and so are less equipped to defend suits on the 
merits.115 
B. The Corresponding Benefits of State Anti-Patent Laws 
Several of the state anti-patent laws that have been enacted are well 
tailored to address some of these critiques of the federal patent system. 
In particular, the laws may address portions of the patent-quality 
critique and are quite well suited to addressing the nuisance-litigation 
and end-user-litigation critiques. They are more poorly suited, 
however, to addressing the patent-troll critique, to the extent patent 
trolls are a problem independent of the other critiques. 
First, the state laws help respond to the patent-quality critique by 
making it harder to enforce low-quality patents. They do this in several 
ways. Some state laws specifically consider the quality of the patent. 
The Vermont law, for instance, asks whether “[t]he claim or assertion 
of patent infringement is meritless, and the person knew, or should 
have known, that the claim or assertion is meritless”116 and whether the 
patent holder “offers to license the patent for an amount that is not 
based on a reasonable estimate of the value of the license.”117 If so, that 
weighs in favor of a bad-faith finding. State laws can also impose due-
diligence requirements that are hard to satisfy with a low-quality patent. 
Vermont again, for instance, asks whether the patent holder “fails to 
conduct an analysis comparing the claims in the patent to the target’s 
products, services, and technology,” or when such an analysis was 
done, whether it “does not identify specific areas in which the products, 
services, and technology are covered by the claims in the patent.”118 It 
is difficult to provide a good-faith analysis of conduct infringing a low-
quality patent. And state laws can ban false threats to sue, as Illinois 
has done; this has a disproportionate impact on low-quality patents, 
since patent holders who realize that their patents are vulnerable are 
much less likely to follow through on litigation threats.119 
 
 114.  Bernstein, supra note 7, at 1450. 
 115.  Id. at 1446–47. 
 116. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197(b)(6) (2016). 
 117. § 4197(b)(5). 
 118. § 4197(b)(2). 
 119. See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2SSS(b)(1) (2015). 
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State laws are not, however, a perfect response to the patent-
quality critique, since instead of focusing on invalid patents, they focus 
on a patent holder’s investigation into a target’s allegedly infringing 
conduct. This is a key disconnect in the state laws: no state has gone 
after low-quality patents directly, such as by forcing patent holders to 
undertake validity analyses or to justify their patents’ validity in 
demand letters. Such laws would almost certainly be preempted, since 
federal law is clear that patents are entitled to a presumption of 
validity.120 And although the overlap between low-quality patents and 
the pre-suit behavior targeted by the state laws is high, it is not perfect; 
in particular, state laws do more to affect patent holders with weak 
infringement cases than with weak invalidity cases, due to that 
presumption of validity. 
Second, states can respond to nuisance litigation and end-user 
litigation by increasing the cost of these mass-litigation strategies 
enough to make them uneconomical. MPHJ, the scanner troll, sent 
more than 16,000 demand letters to small businesses,121 and just like 
senders of spam email, MPHJ’s entire business model depended on the 
low cost of sending letters. If even a small percentage of recipients 
agreed to license the asserted patents, then that small upfront cost 
would be more than covered by licensing revenue. But if state law 
increases the cost of sending demand letters, then a company cannot 
adopt the spammer strategy. And other provisions have similar effects; 
for instance, provisions that ban false threats to sue, or inflated royalty 
demands, reduce the effectiveness of the strategy because they limit the 
patent holder’s ability to extract settlements. 
State anti-patent laws are well suited to combatting these end-user 
and nuisance-litigation strategies. The scanner-troll cases that inspired 
states to get involved were classic end-user cases, for instance, brought 
against small businesses that had no role in designing or producing the 
allegedly infringing products. The state laws would make it 
significantly harder to bring such cases, since they would 
disproportionately raise the cost of bringing end-user cases. This is so 
because the pre-suit requirements imposed by the state laws impose 
costs—of investigating the defendant’s infringing activity, preparing 
infringement allegations, and so forth—that are essentially fixed per 
case. But end-user cases are likely to be smaller in scale, so these costs 
reflect a greater portion of the overall burden of bringing a patent case. 
If the scanner trolls had to satisfy the pre-suit requirements for each of 
 
 120. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 564 
U.S. 91, 91–92 (2011); Ford, supra note 46, at 103–04; Doug Lichtman & Mark A. 
Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 
(2007). 
 121. Johnson, supra note 44, at 2024.  
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their 16,000 end-user lawsuits, that would impose a much greater 
burden than if they sued a half dozen scanner manufacturers. So the 
state laws would make end-user litigation harder without formally 
targeting those cases. At the same time, state anti-patent laws only do 
so much to combat end-user litigation; they cannot ban it outright, or 
impose additional requirements on it, without clearly conflicting with 
federal law. 
Nuisance litigation is similarly targeted. Because the settlement 
pressure of a nuisance suit is driven by litigation costs, a nuisance case 
can be brought without regard to the underlying merits, so long as the 
complaint can pass muster under Rule 11. So a nuisance plaintiff has no 
need to carefully analyze the defendant’s products, develop claim 
charts, or perform other extensive pre-litigation investigation. But 
failure to perform such an investigation is precisely the conduct 
targeted by most states. Vermont’s law, for instance, considers whether 
a patent holder identifies “factual allegations concerning the specific 
areas in which the target’s products, services, and technology infringe 
the patent or are covered by the claims in the patent,”122 or has 
“conduct[ed] an analysis comparing the claims in the patent to the 
target’s products, services, and technology.”123 Other laws target failure 
to inform a defendant of specific infringement allegations—which is 
only possible with a pre-suit investigation. So to the extent state anti-
patent laws have any effect on litigants’ behavior, they should affect the 
behavior of plaintiffs bringing nuisance cases. State anti-patent laws, 
then, are well suited to targeting the two most troubling kinds of patent 
litigation—the ones designed to extract undeserved settlements, not to 
enforce legitimate patent rights. 
Third, to the extent that patent trolls are themselves a problem, 
apart from their use of nuisance and end-user litigation, state laws can 
also target them by considering a patent holder’s status. In Vermont, 
for instance, the law considers as a factor weighing against a finding of 
bad-faith patent assertions whether the patent holder “makes a 
substantial investment in the use of the patent or in the production or 
sale of a product or item covered by the patent” or is the original 
inventor.124 The idea is that a practicing entity enforcing patent rights 
that cover its own product is likely acting in good faith, since it is 
generating social value by selling its own products and since it is well 
positioned to know which competitors’ products are similar enough to 
infringe. But these provisions are likely on even shakier preemption 
 
 122.  tit. 9, § 4197(b)(1)(C). 
 123.  § 4197(b)(2). 
 124.  §§ 4197(c)(4), (5). 
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ground than other state laws, since federal law expressly contemplates 
that patents are alienable property.125 
These provisions are also normatively questionable, since there are 
legitimate arguments that patent trolls or nonpracticing entities can be 
useful to the patent system. Despite these benefits, though, patent trolls 
are core targets of the state anti-patent laws. The laws have been widely 
identified as anti-troll measures, by both academics and the media, and 
trolls were cited by state legislators and witnesses testifying in support 
of the laws.126 If patent trolls really are a problem, though, the state 
laws are only weakly tailored to solving that problem. The laws largely 
address pre-litigation conduct, but a patent troll is not defined by its 
conduct before filing suit; if the real problem with patent trolls is that 
they do not make products, then the state laws may have little effect. 
IV.  THE INSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR LIMITED PATENT 
FEDERALISM 
The last Part detailed the substantive case for limited patent 
federalism by highlighting flaws in the federal patent system and ways 
in which state anti-patent laws can help counter those flaws. The natural 
follow-up is to wonder if the flaws in the federal system are inevitable, 
or if there are federal reforms that could eliminate the need for states to 
get involved in the first place. 
This Part makes the institutional case for limited patent federalism. 
It first highlights ways in which the public-choice economics of the 
federal patent system has rendered its institutions resistant to reform. 
While courts have embraced substantial reforms—largely at the 
insistence of the Supreme Court, in the face of resistance by lower 
federal courts—Congress has been reluctant to act. It then examines the 
corresponding institutions in the states, which have stepped into the 
void left by Congress. States have their own public-choice problems, 
but in this context those problems happen to offset those in the federal 
government. The result is institutional dynamics that target the most 
 
 125.  See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (governing ownership and assignment of 
patent rights). 
126.  E.g., Eric Goldman, Vermont Enacts the Nation’s First Anti-Patent 
Trolling Law, FORBES (May 22, 2013, 2:22 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
ericgoldman/2013/05/22/vermont-enacts-the-nations-first-anti-patent-trolling-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZU68-3HVJ]; Parija Kavilanz, Vermont Fights Back Against ‘Patent 
Trolls,’ CNN MONEY (May 24, 2013, 10:09 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/24/ 
smallbusiness/patent-trolls/ [https://perma.cc/N6NJ-B7FG]; Timothy B. Lee, How 
Vermont Could Save the Nation from Patent Trolls, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/01/how-vermont-could-
save-the-nation-from-patent-trolls/ [https://perma.cc/58CH-EEHQ]. 
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problematic patent assertions while having surprisingly few effects on 
socially desirable patent assertions. 
A. The Flawed Institutions of the Federal Patent System 
The federal patent system is complex, with institutions in all three 
branches of the federal government playing roles. The design of these 
institutions has played a significant role in many of the patent system’s 
failures discussed in the last Part. Some of these failures are likely 
inherent in the institutional design; others could in theory be reformed, 
but reform is made more difficult by the institutional design. This 
section surveys the three branches of the federal government and 
discusses how they have contributed to the status quo. 
1. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: THE PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 
The Patent and Trademark Office is the part of the executive 
branch that administers most of the patent system.127 The principal job 
of the Office is to review patent applications and determine when 
patents should issue, though it also handles administrative litigation 
over patent issuance and administers various procedures for reviewing 
patents after they have been granted.128 And although it does much of 
this job well, the structure of the Office contributes to the patent-quality 
critique highlighted above.129 In other work, I have explained how the 
structure of the examination process may lead to a continuous cycle of 
lower-quality patents.130 Several other structural features of the Office 
also reduce average patent quality. 
The Office has been tasked with what is, in some respects, an 
impossible job: figure out when an invention really is new, based 
largely on the inventor’s (or her attorney’s) description of that 
invention. And the institutional context of that decision makes it 
 
 127.  There are other scattered pieces of the executive branch that play roles in 
the patent system, largely arising out of its intersection with trade policy. Examples 
include the International Trade Commission, which handles administrative patent 
litigation arising under the federal ban on unfair trade practices, see 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1337(b) (2012); Customs and Border Protection, the component of the Department of 
Homeland Security that blocks importation of infringing goods upon issuance of an 
exclusion order by the ITC (along with counterfeit goods and goods infringing 
copyrights), see § 1337(d); and the Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
which negotiates intellectual-property-related trade agreements, see §§ 2112, 
2114a(c)(7), 2171. 
 128. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–42 (2012). 
 129. See supra Part III.A.1. The Office plays a minimal role in patent 
litigation, and has no say in who applies for patents, so contributes far less to the other 
critiques highlighted above. 
 130. See Ford, supra note 101. 
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especially difficult to make correctly, since examiners are overwhelmed 
with work, lack complete information about patent applications and the 
prior art, and are rewarded for the wrong behavior.131 Patent examiners 
spend about eighteen hours on an average patent application, often 
spread out over multiple years; this time includes time spent reviewing 
the application, conducting a prior-art search, reviewing both the prior 
art uncovered by that search and the prior art submitted by the 
applicant, determining if the invention is patentable in light of that prior 
art, preparing office actions (often several), reviewing and responding 
to applicant, and so forth.132 A key step in this process is the prior-art 
review, but examiners often remain ignorant of key prior art because 
searches are often incomplete, applicants are under no obligation to 
conduct a search before filing for a patent, and competitors with an 
incentive to do so are marginalized in the process.133 And examiners are 
judged by their productivity. Though both grants and denials count 
toward this measure, the structure of the patent statute means that only 
a patent grant conclusively closes a file; an applicant can always try 
again, no matter how many times her application has been rejected.134 
Examiners also must justify rejections, but not allowances.135 The result 
is a system that encourages examiners to conduct reviews that are 
cursory rather than searching, and to issue low-quality patents that are 
nevertheless accorded a legal presumption of validity.136 
 
 131. See Ford, supra note 46, at 88–89 (explaining how the structure of the 
Patent and Trademark Office leads to low-quality patents). 
 132.  Id. at 89. 
133.  See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 120, at 54–56; Victor Wong, Going 
from Inquisitorial to Adversarial—By “Victor W,” YALE L. TECH. (Apr. 22, 2011), 
http://www.yalelawtech.org/ip-in-the-digital-age/going-from-inquisitorial-to-
adversarial/ [https://perma.cc/924W-8NXC]. 
 134.  Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 
67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 625–31 (2015); Ford, supra note 46, at 88; Lemley, supra note 
105, at 1496 n.3; Sean Tu, Luck/Unluck of the Draw: An Empirical Study of Examiner 
Allowance Rates, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, at 7–8. 
135. See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2012) (“[I]f on . . . examination it appears that the 
applicant is entitled to a patent under the law, the Director shall issue a patent 
therefor.”); In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992), abrogated on other 
grounds by KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (holding that § 131 
imposes a burden upon examiners to justify rejections); Corinne Langinier & Philippe 
Marcoul, Monetary and Implicit Incentives of Patent Examiners (Univ. of Alta. Dep’t 
of Econ., Working Paper No. 2009-22, 2009), http://www.economics.ualberta.ca/~/
media/economics/FacultyAndStaff/WPs/WP2009-22-Langinier.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QK7P-XK96] (proposing to reward examiners for rejections instead of 
allowances).  
 136. See also 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (creating a presumption that patents 
are valid); Ford, supra note 46, at 88; supra Part III.A.1. 
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Empirical evidence demonstrates that examiners respond to these 
incentives; examiners, like everybody else, act to maximize their own 
utility rather than to further the best interests of the patent system.137 
For instance, one study found that when examiners are promoted, 
leaving less time to spend on examination, they cite less prior art, 
become less likely to make time-consuming obviousness rejections, and 
become more likely to grant patent applications.138 That study 
concluded that time constraints on examiners inflate the Office’s patent-
grant rate by approximately fourteen percentage points.139 Another 
study found that more-senior patent examiners systematically cite less 
prior art and are more likely to grant patents than more-junior 
examiners.140 Examiners are also subject to the same cognitive biases as 
everybody else. For instance, one study found that examiners 
systematically disregard prior art submitted by patent applicants at the 
expense of art the examiners find themselves.141 This finding held up 
regardless of how many citations a patent applicant submitted and 
regardless of the relevance of the art, suggesting that examiners see 
greater value in prior art they find themselves, regardless of actual 
value.142 
 
 137. With apologies to Richard Posner. See Richard A. Posner, What Do 
Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 1 (1993). 
 138. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to 
Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence 
from Micro-Level Application Data, REV. ECON. & STAT. (forthcoming 2017), http:// 
www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/REST_a_00605 [https://perma.cc/DYV9-
ZQUL].  
 139. Id. at 28 (“[O]ur analysis implies that if all examiners were allocated as 
many hours as are extended to GS-7 examiners, the Patent Office’s overall grant rate 
would fall by roughly 14 percentage points, or nearly 20 percent. Based on 2013 filing 
numbers this would amount to approximately 114,000 fewer issued patents for that 
year.”). 
 140. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent 
Office Outcomes, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 817, 822 (2012). Another study concluded 
that this represented rational movement between two local optima: a “when in doubt, 
reject” strategy that is optimal when one’s work is being closely supervised, and a 
“when in doubt, grant” strategy that becomes preferable when one’s work is no longer 
subject to close scrutiny. See Tu, supra note 134, 20–21. 
 141. Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter?, 42 
RES. POL’Y 844, 847, 853 (2013). 
 142. Id. at 851. There are several possible explanations for why examiners 
would prefer to rely on prior art they find to prior art submitted by applicants. One 
possibility is that doing so might be easier for examiners, since the processes of finding 
and analyzing art overlap. Another possibility is that examiners are more likely to trust 
or see value in information they have a hand in producing. See, e.g., Christopher 
Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2010); Cotropia et al., supra note 41, at 851; Michael I. Norton et 
al., The IKEA Effect: When Labor Leads to Love, 22 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 453, 457–58 
(2012). 
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These factors lead to quality problems when measured against a 
baseline of “correct” application of prevailing patent doctrine,143 but 
there is also the possibility that the Office is administering a 
normatively problematic version of patent law. And the Office has 
played a role there as well, in ways that may have led to an undesirable 
expansion of patent rights.144 
To be sure, there are structural features that help reduce quality 
problems at the Office. The Office administers several mechanisms to 
review patents and revoke them when they prove invalid.145 Those 
procedures employ a broader standard for claim construction than is 
employed in district-court litigation, asking what the broadest 
reasonable interpretation is of a patent claim; this makes it easier to 
invalidate a marginal claim.146 And the Office has instituted an 
Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative and appointed a Deputy 
Commissioner for Patent Quality to find ways to combat quality 
problems in the patent system.147 The Initiative is overseeing several 
programs to improve patent quality, including a pilot program to gauge 
the use of glossaries in patent specifications,148 a program to conduct 
early interviews between applicants and examiners,149 and a pioneering 
 
 143. See generally R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality 
Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2138 (2009) (defining patent quality by 
reference to the rules of patentability). But see Christi J. Guerrini, Defining Patent 
Quality, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091 (2014). 
 144. See, e.g., Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470 (2011) 
(positing that the interplay of Patent and Trademark Office granting decisions and 
administrative appeals to the Federal Circuit leads to a gradual expansion in 
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Ouellette, What Are the Sources of Patent Inflation? An Analysis of Federal Circuit 
Patentability Rulings, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 347 (2011). 
 145. These procedures include ex parte reexamination, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–
307 (2012); inter partes review, see §§ 311–318; post-grant review, see §§ 321–329; 
and “covered business method” review, see id.; Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284, 329 (2011). 
 146. See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 793 F.3d 1297, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(denying rehearing en banc). 
147.  See Request for Comments on Enhancing Patent Quality, 80 Fed. Reg. 
6475 (Feb. 5, 2015) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1); Michelle K. Lee, USPTO 
Launches Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative, UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFF. (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/uspto_launches_ 
enhanced_patent_quality [https://perma.cc/8EMN-CZ9H]. 
148.  Press Release, USPTO, USPTO Launches New Glossary Pilot Program 
to Promote Patent Claim Clarity (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/about-
us/news-updates/uspto-launches-new-glossary-pilot-program-promote-patent-claim-
clarity [https://perma.cc/2CCF-M9Q9]. 
 149. US Patent & Trademark Office, Full First Action Interview Pilot 
Program, 1367 OFFICIAL GAZETTE PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF. 42 (2011), 
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program to crowd-source prior art.150 It is too early to tell, however, 
how large an effect these efforts will have. 
2. THE JUDICIAL BRANCH: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND THE DISTRICT 
COURTS 
Once a patent has been issued by the Patent Office, enforcement is 
left largely to civil litigation brought by the patent holder.151 Two 
components of the judiciary that hear many patent cases, the Federal 
Circuit and certain district courts, have contributed significantly to the 
flaws in the patent system discussed above. 
The Federal Circuit was created in 1982 with the goal of bringing 
greater uniformity to patent law, a field that in the preceding decades 
had been characterized by great disuniformity between the regional 
circuits, forum shopping by patent holders and potential defendants, 
and general disinterest from the Supreme Court.152 And the court 
succeeded in creating greater uniformity; gone are the days when the 
choice of circuit would have a greater-than-fifty-percent effect on the 
chances that the patent would be found valid.153 But the Federal Circuit 
has brought its own problems. It has developed a reputation as a patent-
friendly court, shaping doctrine in ways that benefit patent holders at 




 150. Request for Comments and Notice of Roundtable on USPTO Use of 
Crowdsourcing to Identify Relevant Prior Art, 79 Fed. Reg. 67159 (Nov. 12, 2014). 
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100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1454–64 (2012). 
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(2004). 
 154.  E.g., Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power 
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relationship with the Supreme Court, resisting attempts from above to 
change patent doctrine.155 It is overly reliant on rules that enhance its 
own power over standards that might give more power to the Patent 
and Trademark Office or the district courts.156 And it is internally slow 
to move when patent doctrine needs changing or correction.157 
These characteristics of the Federal Circuit have contributed to the 
critiques of patent law described above. The Federal Circuit has shifted 
substantive patent law in ways that exacerbate the patent-quality 
problem, for instance, by essentially gutting the definiteness 
requirement,158 or by interpreting few claims as means-plus-function 
 
 155. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), holding that method claims 
covering a medical diagnostic test were not patentable, patent lawyer Gene Quinn 
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How long will it take the Federal Circuit to overrule this 
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v. Teleflex [Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007)] will be overruled. 
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Claim on Claim Indefiniteness: An Empirical Study of Definiteness Cases of the Past 
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claims governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012).159 Both of these rules 
had the effect of making it easier for a patent holder to obtain and 
enforce broad, vague patent claims.160 And once a patent holder has 
obtained a low-quality patent, the Federal Circuit has made it easier to 
bring nuisance suits, patent-troll suits, and end-user suits. The court has 
refused, for instance, to entertain appeals of claim-construction rulings 
before cases have made it to final judgment, which makes it almost 
impossible to avoid expansive discovery over infringement, validity, 
and damages issues except by settling.161 Yet at the same time, the court 
reviews almost all claim-construction decisions de novo and reverses 
district courts’ constructions in a large percentage of cases; this renders 
cases more uncertain and increases litigation costs and plaintiffs’ ability 
to apply settlement pressure.162 
Certain district courts have followed the Federal Circuit’s lead and 
have made life easier for patent plaintiffs—most notoriously the Eastern 
District of Texas, but including others as well.163 There are various 
 
Decade with a Focus on the Federal Circuit and the Insolubly Ambiguous Standard, 10 
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 25, 30–34 (2010). 
 159. From 2004 to 2015, the Federal Circuit enforced a “strong” presumption 
that claim language not using the word “means” should not be construed as means-plus-
function claim governed by § 112(f). See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 
1339, 1347–49 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that the test for whether a claim 
term is interpreted as a means-plus-function term is “whether the words of the claim are 
understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning 
as the name for structure”). 
 160. These are far from the only Federal Circuit doctrines that have affected 
patent quality; they are just two especially clear examples. See also Masur, supra note 
144; Wasserman, supra note 144. 
 161. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en 
banc); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent 
Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 33–38 (2001); Edward Reines & Nathan Greenblatt, 
Interlocutory Appeals of Claim Construction in the Patent Reform Act of 2009, 2009 
PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 1. 
 162. Before Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015), the 
Federal Circuit reviewed claim constructions de novo. Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1454 
(en banc). Since Teva, claim constructions that depend on factual findings about 
extrinsic evidence are reviewed deferentially, but since most claim constructions are 
based only on intrinsic evidence, most reviews remain de novo. 
 163. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. 
PA. L. REV. 631, 632–34 (2015); Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 
89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 241–45 (2016); Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent 
Case, 38 AIPLA Q. J. 1, 4–5, 11 (2010); 441: When Patents Attack!, THIS AM. LIFE 
(July 22, 2011), https://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/when-
patents-attack [https://perma.cc/4M57-X4BW] (“Why would a company rent an office 
in a tiny town in East Texas, put a nameplate on the door, and leave it completely 
empty for a year? The answer involves a controversial billionaire physicist in Seattle, a 
40 pound cookbook, and a war waging right now, all across the software and tech 
industries.”); 496: When Patents Attack . . . Part Two, THIS AM. LIFE (May 31, 2013), 
https://www.thisamericanlife.org/ radio-archives/episode/496/when-patents-attack-part-
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reasons a patent holder might prefer one district to another: 
convenience, speed, low cost, ability to exercise personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant, willingness to allow cases to go to trial, or friendly 
juries, for instance. Most of these reasons are benign, but two potential 
reasons are especially problematic, one substantive and one procedural. 
The substantive problem is that plaintiff-friendly districts might be 
more inclined to rule in favor of patent holders—that is, those districts 
might be biased in favor of patent holders—at least compared to the 
baseline of other district courts. This can happen in several ways: 
favorable claim constructions, grants or denials of summary judgment, 
discovery rulings, and rulings on motions to admit or exclude evidence. 
If one court is more favorable to plaintiffs than another, of course, it 
does not follow that the first court is the one that’s wrong. But if the 
substantive critiques of the patent system are correct, and patent quality 
is a significant problem, then we should be more skeptical of courts that 
are predisposed to rule in favor of patent holders. There is, however, 
little evidence that district courts preferred by patent holders are 
substantively biased in their favor.164 
The procedural problem is that even if a plaintiff-friendly district 
does nothing troubling on the merits, it can adopt rules and make 
procedural rulings that enhance the plaintiff’s merits position or ability 
to extract settlements. Again, this can happen in innumerable ways: a 
court can order aggressive timetables for discovery or mandatory 
disclosures (e.g., of a defendant’s invalidity arguments); it can 
sequence litigation steps to drive up costs; it can decline to certify 
questions for interlocutory review; it can send more cases to trial or 
allow for longer trials. Many of these decisions are the sort of 
procedural decision over which district judges have nearly unbounded 
discretion, and individually they have relatively little importance. But in 
the aggregate they can have a significant effect. 
And though there is little evidence of substantive bias, there are 
numerous examples of district courts adopting procedural rules that 
give plaintiffs advantages. For instance, one of the Eastern District of 
Texas’s key procedural innovations in attracting patent cases was a 
local rule, applicable only to patent cases, that required defendants to 
 
two [https://perma.cc/9985-UD5G] (“Two years ago, we did a program about a 
mysterious business in Texas that threatens companies with lawsuits for violating its 
patents. But the world of patent lawsuits is so secretive, there were basic questions we 
could not answer. Now we can. And we get a glimpse why people say our patent 
system may be discouraging, not encouraging, innovation.”). 
 164. Two coauthors and I will explore this question further in future work, 
tentatively titled Does Venue Shopping Work? Some Evidence from Patent Appeals. 
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serve invalidity contentions far earlier than in other district courts.165 
This made it harder for defendants to defend against infringement 
claims without investing substantial expert and attorney work into 
developing invalidity arguments early in the case, increasing the 
incentive to settle early, and thus the sums plaintiffs could demand in 
settlement. Another key innovation in the district was a model order, 
adopted by two judges of the court, that dispenses with the general 
procedure for serving document requests and instead requires parties to 
“produce or permit the inspection of all documents, electronically 
stored information, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or 
control of the party that are relevant to the pleaded claims or defenses 
involved in this action.”166 This imposes an enormous discovery burden 
on defendants, but often requires nonpracticing plaintiffs to do little. 
Not all plaintiff-friendly procedures are inherently troubling, even if 
one thinks the patent system is otherwise flawed in favor of patent 
holders; speed and low costs have inherent virtues of their own. But 
procedures that effectively reduce costs for patent holders, and increase 
them for defendants, are another story. 
To be sure, the Supreme Court has taken an increased interest in 
patent cases in the last decade, which has effectively countered some of 
the Federal Circuit’s more pro-patent holdings.167 Likewise, the Federal 
Circuit has responded to some of the Eastern District of Texas’s 
abuses, most notably by reigning in its refusal to transfer cases to other 
districts.168 But both courts have chafed under supervision. The Federal 
Circuit is notorious for resisting Supreme Court guidance.169 And in 
 
 165. See Anderson, supra note 153, at 652 & n.11; Alisha Kay Taylor, What 
Does Forum Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas Mean for Patent Reform?, 6 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 570, 572–73 (2007). 
 166. Sample Discovery Order for Patent Cases Assigned to Judge Rodney 
Gilstrap & Judge Roy Payne, U.S. DIST. CT.: E. DIST. TEX., 
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/page1.shtml?location=info:judge&judge=12 
[https://perma.cc/8KGS-EAKW] (last visited Mar. 31, 2017). 
 167. Since 2005, the Supreme Court has decided more than thirty patent cases, 
usually reversing or vacating the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse 
Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1931 (2016); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 843; 
Limelight Networks v. Akamai Techs., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2120 (2014); Nautilus, Inc. v. 
Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2131 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology 
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2114, 2120 (2013); Mayo Collaborative 
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 92 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 
593, 612–13 (2010); Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elec., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 
(2008); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427–28 (2007); Microsoft Corp. 
v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 458–59 (2007); eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, LLC, 547 
U.S. 388, 394 (2006). 
 168. E.g., In re Nintendo of Am., Inc., 756 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re 
Toyota Motor Corp., 747 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re Google Inc., 588 F. App’x 
988 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re TOA Techs., Inc., 543 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  
 169. See supra note 155. 
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one of the most striking moves yet by the Eastern District of Texas, 
two judges of that court published sample docket-control orders170 for 
use in patent cases that require defendants to seek permission, or wait 
until after claim construction, to file a motion to dismiss under Alice 
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l.171 That case tightened the rules governing 
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012), casting doubt 
on most software and business-method patents. And since Alice, courts 
have invalidated many such patents on motions to dismiss;172 this made 
it far harder to rely on those patents to bring nuisance, patent-troll, or 
end-user cases, since the threat of expensive discovery is reduced. The 
Eastern District of Texas eventually backed off its approach in the face 
of public criticism.173 But the approach indicates the efforts to which 
courts may be willing to go to resist patent reforms. 
3. THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH: CONGRESS AND PATENT REFORM 
Many of the problems discussed above could be addressed by 
Congress; indeed, several patent reform bills have been introduced in 
recent years, and one of them, the America Invents Act, was enacted in 
2011.174 The interest-group dynamics of patent reform, however, has 
combined with Congress’s institutional inertia to kill most reform 
proposals and to water down the one bill that was enacted. 
All of the critiques highlighted above are amenable to statutory 
reform, to greater or lesser extents. Numerous statutory means have 
been proposed to improve the quality of patent examination, though it is 
 
 170. Sample Docket Control Order for Patent Cases Assigned to Judge Rodney 
Gilstrap & Judge Roy Payne, U.S. DIST. CT.: E. DIST. TEX., 
http://www.txed.uscourts. gov/page1.shtml?location=info:judge&judge=12 
[https://perma.cc/8KGS-EAKW] (last visited Mar. 31, 2017); see also Joe Mullin, East 
Texas Judge’s Invention: A Method for Hampering Patent Defendants, ARS TECHNICA 
(June 11, 2015, 3:57 PM) https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/06/east-texas-
judges-invention-a-method-for-hampering-patent-defendants/ [https://perma.cc/E6T4-
ASQV]; Vera Ranieri, Judges in Texas Unfairly Impose New Requirements on Patent 
Defendants, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 10, 2015), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/06/judges-texas-unfairly-impose-new-requirements-
patent-defendants [https://perma.cc/J2MD-S4CR]; Vera Ranieri, With Kafkaesque 
Flourish, the Eastern District of Texas Penalizes Parties for Following the Rules, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 
2015/08/kafkaesque-flourish-eastern-district-texas-penalizes-parties-following-rules 
[https://perma.cc/5LDC-ZV36]. 
 171. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 172. See Wilburn et al., supra note 103. 
 173.  Kevin Penton, Judge Gilstrap Rewrites Rules for Alice Motions in Texas, 
LAW360 (Nov. 12, 2015, 4:31 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/726270/judge-
gilstrap-rewrites-rules-for-alice-motions-in-texas [https://perma.cc/745J-PCV6]. 
 174. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011). 
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likely that these proposals could only do so much.175 Litigation reforms 
are more promising, since Congress has several policy levers that could 
be manipulated, including the rules of evidence and procedure and the 
fee-shifting rules.176 Indeed, one simple reform, awarding attorney fees 
to prevailing parties in patent cases, would almost singlehandedly gut 
the implicit threat of expensive litigation costs that drives nuisance 
settlements. (Though it would concededly have other effects, some 
difficult to predict.) 
The America Invents Act shows just how difficult it is to enact 
these sorts of reforms. The law was enacted in 2011177 after many years 
of complaints about the patent system, but wound up doing very little 
about those complaints. Of the law’s two most important changes, only 
one had anything to do with patent quality or litigation abuse. That set 
of provisions provided new ways for the Patent and Trademark Office 
to revoke patents when it concludes that they were erroneously granted, 
but did nothing ex ante to change the Office’s error rate, or to address 
litigation abuse. And the other important change, a rewrite of patent 
law’s priority rules and switch from a first-to-invent system to a first-
inventor-to-file system, brings United States patent law into agreement 
with foreign patent systems, but does nothing to address flaws with 
patent quality or litigation abuses.178 
The Act’s reforms were far narrower than many that Congress 
considered in the years prior to the law’s enactment, thanks in large 
part to lobbying against those proposals. The debate over patent reform 
has largely turned into a battle between the technology and 
pharmaceutical industries. Companies that make computer hardware, 
telecommunications products, and especially software and online 
services have mostly supported patent-reform efforts, both because they 
are common targets of infringement suits and because their businesses 
 
 175. Patent examination may just be inherently difficult, so that error rates will 
always be significant: patent applications by their nature deal in the cutting edge, 
applicants will necessarily know more about their inventions than will examiners, and 
the universe of potentially relevant prior art is so vast that examiners may reasonably 
not be expected to uncover everything relevant. Moreover, even if errors could be 
eliminated, it would likely be cost-inefficient to do so. See Lemley, supra note 105. 
Indeed, the patent system has shown a surprising resilience to change. See Mark A. 
Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System (Stanford Pub. Law, Working 
Paper No. 2784456), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2784456 [https://perma.cc/5KNL-
BC9J]. 
 176. See generally Ford, supra note 101 (arguing that, because of a vicious 
cycle in the patent system, litigation reforms could have a beneficial effect on patent 
quality). 
 177.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18. 
 178. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
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often do not depend on patent rights.179 (Many of the exceptions come 
from a set of companies, like Kodak, Texas Instruments, and Micron 
Technology, that have monetized their patent portfolios as other 
revenue streams have declined.) The pharmaceutical industry, on the 
other hand, both is heavily dependent on patent rights and is relatively 
immune to patent trolls and nuisance suits. It has thus fought several 
reform bills, arguing that they would impose new burdens on all patent 
holders instead of targeting the most problematic lawsuits.180 For 
instance, the pharmaceutical industry has pointed to unexpected uses of 
the new inter partes review procedure as showing the risks of broad 
patent reform. Using that procedure, hedge funds have challenged 
pharmaceutical patents and shorted stocks of their owners, hoping to 
profit when share prices fall.181 Pharmaceutical lobbyists have insisted 
that their patents be exempt from inter partes review or that the system 
be significantly weakened.182 
The wild card for patent-reform efforts is that other interest and 
industry groups have started getting involved, including groups that 
have little to do with technology or traditional patent matters. For 
instance, the National Association of Realtors—the nation’s second-
most-active lobbying group, but one that normally sticks to housing and 
financial issues—has supported patent-reform bills after seeing 
members become ensnared in the scanner cases.183 Similarly, the 
National Retail Federation has taken up the issue after seeing member 
retailers targeted by patent trolls; one lobbyist for the group said that 
 
 179. They’ve also been joined by low-tech companies that use commodity 
technology products. See, e.g., Mario Trujillo, Tech Companies Join Retailers in 
Patent Push, HILL (Jan. 15, 2015, 9:57 AM), 
http://thehill.com/policy/technology/229596-tech-companies-team-with-retailers-on-
patent-reform [https://perma.cc/L9FF-UJZZ]. 
 180. E.g., Robert Zirkelbach, What They Are Saying: Stakeholders Raise 
Concerns about Patent Reform, PHRMA: PHARM. RES. & MFRS. AM. (Apr. 24, 2015), 
http://catalyst.phrma.org/what-they-are-saying-stakeholders-raise-concerns-about-
patent-litigation-reform [https://perma.cc/7M66-C7FA]. 
 181. Joseph Walker & Rob Copeland, New Hedge Fund Strategy: Dispute the 
Patent, Short the Stock, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2015, 7:24 PM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/hedge-fund-manager-kyle-bass-challenges-jazz-pharmaceuticals-patent-
1428417408 [https://perma.cc/7ZFN-49BR]. 
 182. E.g., Press Release, Biotechnology Innovation Org., BIO Opposes H.R. 
9, the Innovation Act (June 11, 2015), https://www.bio.org/media/press-release/bio-
opposes-hr-9-innovation-act [https://perma.cc/6VJB-2KPG]. 
 183. E.g., Kate Ackley, K Street Files: Realtors Rack Up Record Lobby Tab, 
ROLL CALL (Jan. 27, 2015, 1:02 PM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/beltway-insiders/k-
street-files-national-association-of-realtors/ [https://perma.cc/DMH8-3JS6]; Press 
Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, Senate Patent Reform Bill a Good First Step, Say 
Realtors (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.realtor.org/news-releases/2015/04/senate-patent-
reform-bill-a-good-first-step-say-realtors [https://perma.cc/D6ZB-A44L]. 
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patent lawsuits have “gone from a nuisance to a real issue.”184 As more 
interest groups are adversely affected by the problems in the patent 
system discussed above, and are affected enough to focus lobbying 
efforts on the problem, the coalition that supports strong reforms should 
get larger and the likelihood of some reform bill passing should 
increase. 
B. State Institutions and Patent Federalism 
State anti-patent laws would serve no purpose if they were as 
difficult to enact as meaningful federal reforms. But thanks to a 
veritable perfect storm of factors, led by favorable legislative 
environments in many states, state efforts to change the patent system 
have expanded rapidly. Public-choice theory helps explain the rapid 
expansion of state anti-patent laws.185 Two of public-choice theory’s 
basic observations have been especially important to the rise of patent 
federalism: the importance of interest groups and of agenda-setting 
institutions to the legislative process. Moreover, the laws have been 
structured in a way to limit opposition from opposing interest groups, 
leading to legislative debates that have been strikingly one-sided. 
1. INTEREST-GROUP SUPPORT 
Interest groups and the structure of interest-group influence in 
statehouses have played important roles in getting state anti-patent laws 
passed. Legislatures are more likely to enact policies that provide 
benefits to concentrated interest groups than to enact policies with more 
broadly dispersed benefits.186 This is so because it is easier for smaller 
 
 184. Andria Cheng, Why Retailers Became a Top Target of Patent Trolls, 
MARKETWATCH (July 25, 2014, 11:23 AM), http://blogs.marketwatch.com/ 
behindthestorefront/2014/07/25/why-retailers-became-a-top-target-of-patent-trolls/ 
[https://perma.cc/PED6-2MG8] (observing that in the first half of 2014, 136 retailers 
were sued in 264 patent cases brought by nonpracticing entities); see also Press 
Release, Nat’l Retail Fed’n, Nat’l Retail Fed’n Forms Patent Reform Coalition (Jan. 
15, 2015), https://nrf.com/media/press-releases/national-retail-federation-forms-patent-
reform-coalition [https://perma.cc/VWP8-Q7L3].  
 185.  See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC 
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 1 (1991) (“Public choice theory is a hybrid: the 
application of the economist’s methods to the political scientist’s subject.”); Tom 
Ginsburg, Ways of Criticizing Public Choice: The Uses of Empiricism and Theory in 
Legal Scholarship, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1139, 1140–41 (observing that public choice is 
less a theory than a collection of related observations). 
 186. See generally, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 472–500 
(2003); Farber & Frickey, supra note 185, at 12–37. This is sometimes regarded as the 
Chicago School branch of public-choice theory. E.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. 
Frickey, Public Choice Revisited, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1715, 1717 (1998). This is not to 
say, of course, that interest groups are the only things that matter, or that legislators do 
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groups to organize and influence legislators than it is for the general 
public, and because groups are more likely to organize in support of 
policies that provide them the greatest benefits.187 This dynamic has 
played out in the states: legislatures have been receptive to anti-patent 
laws in significant part because groups that would benefit from those 
laws are (relatively) small and concentrated, and have preexisting 
channels of influence in statehouses, while groups that would suffer 
from them are (relatively) dispersed and have little preexisting influence 
over state legislators. 
The main interest groups driving the adoption of state anti-patent 
laws have been trade associations representing local businesses and 
nonprofits targeted by patent trolls sending demand letters.188 The 
importance of these interest groups is shown in the legislative history of 
these laws, at least in the (few) states that make detailed legislative 
history easily available.189 For instance, in Wisconsin, five local 
business groups and two local companies lobbied in support of the anti-
patent bill that eventually became law.190 Those groups are longtime 
players in Wisconsin politics and include the state’s most influential 
business and banking groups.191 Similarly, representatives of the 
 
not respond to constituent needs or vote in favor of their own policy preferences; 
rather, all else being equal, the support of an influential interest group matters. See 
FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 185, at 21–33 (summarizing the empirical evidence). 
 187. E.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent 
Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975) (“The 
price that the winning [interest] group bids [for favorable legislation] is determined both 
by the value of legislative protection to the group’s members and the group’s ability to 
overcome the free-rider problems that plague coalitions.”). 
 188. Gugliuzza, supra note 44, at 1590–91 (“Vermont’s statute seems, by all 
accounts, to have been the product of a grassroots effort by businesses and nonprofits in 
the state who had received demand letters from bottom feeders such as MPHJ.”). 
 189. I am indebted to Paul Gugliuzza and Dan Risica for sharing their research 
on the legislative histories of state anti-patent laws. 
 190. The business groups were the Alliance of Wisconsin Retailers, the 
Wisconsin Bankers Association, the Wisconsin Grocers Association, the Wisconsin 
Hotel and Lodging Association, and Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce. The 
companies were Northeast Communications of Wisconsin, Inc. and Quad/Graphics, 
Inc., a large public company that is based in Wisconsin. See Our Journey to Transform 
Quad: 2014 Shareholders Letter and Annual Report on Form 10-K, QUAD/GRAPHICS, 
INC. (Dec. 31, 2014), http://investors.qg.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=231687&p=irol-
reportsannual [https://perma.cc/PNL7-GS5V]; Wis. Ethics Comm’n, 2013–2014 
Legislative Session: Senate Bill 498, EYE ON LOBBYING, 
https://lobbying.wi.gov/What/BillInformation/ 2013REG/Information/10968?tab-
=Efforts [https://perma.cc/T6ZQ-8ZZE] (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). 
 191. E.g., Jeff Mayers, State Recycling Bill Passes, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 21, 
1990, at 1A (calling Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce “the state’s most 
influential business group”); Karen Rivedal, WMC Names Leader to Replace Haney, 
WIS. ST. J., Mar. 4, 2011, at B8 (calling the Wisconsin Bankers Association “the 
state’s largest financial industry trade group” and Wisconsin Manufacturers and 
Commerce “the state’s most influential business and industrial lobby”). 
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Midwest chapter of the Printing Industries of America and the 
Nebraska Bankers Association testified in support of an anti-patent bill 
that eventually became law in that state, as did the Oregon Home 
Builders Association in writing in that state.192 The Oregon association 
pointed to demand letters its member companies had received, 
discussing a newly issued patent that allegedly “covers certain moisture 
removal processes that you are presently using, or may use in the 
future, in your construction business;” the association called the letters 
“precisely the sort of shakedown that [the bill] is designed to 
prevent.”193 
The bills were not without opponents. In Wisconsin, for instance, 
representatives of the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation and the 
biotechnology industry group BioForward testified against the bill, and 
two multinational pharmaceutical companies, AstraZeneca and Johnson 
& Johnson, lobbied against the bill.194 But many more large companies 
and trade associations—including several that rely on patent rights, like 
3M, GlaxoSmithKline, Microsoft, and PhRMA—lobbied without 
opposing the bill, likely to help shape its terms so they would apply to 
fewer patent assertions.195 Indeed, as discussed below, the laws are 
structured such that they largely affect only the most problematic patent 
assertions and leave most patent assertions unscathed, likely thanks in 
part to this sort of lobbying.196 
Even with mixed support for these bills, the balance of interest-
group support tilted in favor of enacting the bills. Although there has 
been some overlap, in general local businesses and groups have been 
more likely to support anti-patent bills, while national businesses and 
groups have been more likely to oppose them. This asymmetry arises 
because the rights conveyed by the patent system are national in scope; 
national businesses, then, should be more likely to rely on patent rights, 
since local patent holders leave markets on the table and would be 
amortizing the fixed costs of obtaining patent rights across a smaller 
 
 192. Hearing on LB677 Before S. Judiciary Comm., 2014 Leg., 103rd Sess. 
17–24 (Neb. 2014) [hereinafter Hearing on LB677], 
http://www.nebraskalegislature.gov/ FloorDocs/103/PDF/Transcripts/Judiciary/2014-02-
05.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVL2-VL2F]; Letter from Jon Chandler, Or. Home Builders 
Ass’n, to Senate Comm. on Judiciary (Feb. 12, 2014).  
 193. Letter from Jon Chandler, supra note 192.  
 194. Hearing on S.B. 498 Before the Wis. S. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 
Pub. Works, and Telecomms., 2013–14 Leg. (Wis. 2014) [hereinafter Hearing on S.B. 
498], http://www.wiseye.org/Programming/VideoArchive/EventDetail.aspx?evhdid-
=8494 [https://perma.cc/8PJU-E8L2]; Wis. Ethics Comm’n, supra note 190. 
 195. Wis. Ethics Comm’n, supra note 190. 
 196. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
2017:551     The Uneasy Case for Patent Federalism 599 
market.197 But local businesses are also more likely to succeed in 
lobbying state legislatures, since they are more likely to have 
preexisting channels of influence in statehouses. Both national and local 
businesses are affected by state laws, but local law is relatively more 
important to local businesses; for national businesses, a single state’s 
law usually constrains only a small percentage of the business’s 
operations. 
Local business support for anti-patent bills is also likely to be more 
intense than national opposition, because the benefits such bills offer to 
local businesses are likely to be greater than the costs to national 
businesses. This is so because businesses that do not rely on patent 
rights can only benefit from laws that make it harder to enforce patent 
rights, while businesses that rely on patent rights can benefit or suffer 
under such laws, since they can be both plaintiffs and defendants in 
patent cases. This especially describes the status quo for many 
electronics companies, since they both frequently patent their own 
inventions and frequently get sued for infringing others’ patents. This 
explains why many businesses did not lobby for or against the laws, but 
instead sought modifications of draft bills. 
These effects are all felt on the margins, of course; there are many 
local businesses that rely on patent rights or lack ties to statehouses, 
just as there are many national businesses that do not rely on patent 
rights or that have state lobbying operations. And there are other 
reasons states have enacted anti-patent laws, including the widespread 
feeling that the patent system needs reform. But the relative strength of 
interest groups does help explain why so many states have so quickly 
enacted anti-patent laws, in contrast with Congress’s failure to enact 
meaningful patent reform. 
2. AGENDA-SETTING INSTITUTIONS 
Public-choice theory also suggests that legislative outcomes can be 
unpredictable because there is usually no equilibrium policy outcome 
that is preferable to every other outcome, and therefore that agenda 
setters198 often have broad powers to shape policy outcomes.199 
 
 197. These costs average about $20,000 to $30,000 per patent, see supra note 
105, which are relatively small in the grand scheme of things to a large national 
business, but become more significant the smaller a business is. 
 198.  This Article uses the term “agenda setter” in a broad sense, to refer to 
decision makers who determine or influence which policy proposals are considered and 
voted on by legislatures, not just the individual (usually a committee chair or legislative 
leader) who decides what proposals get votes and in what order. Using this definition, 
some of the formal findings of public-choice theory about agenda setting may not apply. 
But the general observation that legislative outcomes are often indeterminate and that 
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Legislative leaders are the most traditional form of agenda setters, but 
there are numerous other means by which individuals and groups can 
shape the policy choices that legislators consider. Indeed, interest 
groups are, in a sense, just a specific case of the general category of 
agenda setter. Besides interest groups, three other forms of agenda 
setting have played important roles in the enactment of state anti-patent 
laws. 
First, state attorneys general have played important roles in 
drawing legislators’ attention to the problems that state anti-patent laws 
are designed to address. In some cases, they did so after using, or 
attempting to use, existing provisions of state law to go after patent 
trolls; for instance, the Vermont, Nebraska, and Minnesota attorneys 
general all sued or sent cease-and-desist letters to MPHJ.200 After 
Nebraska’s attorney general was slapped down by a federal court that 
held that the office had exceeded its authority in sending a cease-and-
desist letter,201 the office worked with a state senator to draft 
Nebraska’s bill and testified in its support.202 Similarly, the legislative 
director of the Oregon Department of Justice testified that a law was 
needed because the Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act “does not 
specifically address conduct arising from demands based upon patent 
rights” and because that law’s “more general provisions may not have 
application as demands or allegations of patent infringement are often 
directed towards businesses,” not consumers.203 Without state attorneys 
general identifying the problem, drafting legislative language, and 
advocating for passage, it is likely that few or no states would have 
enacted anti-patent laws. 
Second, states have acted as de facto agenda setters for other 
states, since once one state has drafted legislation to address a widely 
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acknowledged problem, other states are free to borrow that language. 
In Nebraska, for instance, an assistant attorney general testified that 
“[t]he vast majority of [the Nebraska bill was] patterned off of the 
Vermont statute.”204 A senator later asked: “Are you very comfortable 
with this language that you copied from Vermont? Are you satisfied 
that they had very competent legal minds, that this language is carefully 
crafted and the bill is tightly drafted? That’s your feeling about this?”205 
The assistant attorney general responded “I am, Senator. Yes,” which 
was apparently sufficient assurance.206 Legislators are risk-averse, so 
reassurance that other states have taken the same action, with no 
obvious downsides presenting themselves, may help explain the rapid 
expansion of these laws. 
Third, the Council of State Governments, an influential 
organization that advises and lobbies on behalf of state governments, 
has acted as an agenda setter by including recommended language 
based on Vermont’s law in its latest round of suggested state 
legislation.207 Recommendations of the Council often spread to many 
states; indeed, a common pattern is for one state to enact legislation to 
address a common issue, and for other states to then follow suit on the 
Council’s recommendation.208 Though the Council’s recommendation is 
new, this pattern has begun playing out in the patent context: one of the 
latest states to enact an anti-patent law, Florida, specifically cited the 
recommendation in a bill analysis.209 
Agenda setters have limited power; they cannot force legislatures 
to enact laws that do not have the support of enough legislators.210 But 
the universe of bills that might attract enough support to pass a 
legislature is large, and recipients of demand letters and other agenda 
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setters have played a key role in drawing legislator attention to the 
patent issue. 
3. POLICY DESIGN AND SELECTION EFFECTS 
State anti-patent laws have been designed to apply to the most 
troublesome patent assertions, and to avoid the most common ones, 
minimizing interest-group opposition in state legislatures. Coupled with 
the interest-group and agenda-setter support discussed above, this 
relatively muted opposition has made it easier for state legislatures to 
enact anti-patent laws. 
By targeting demand letters and inflated threats to sue rather than 
lawsuits themselves, state anti-patent laws have their greatest effects on 
nuisance suits, end-user suits, and other suits with low likelihoods of 
success. Patent holders bringing these kinds of cases will necessarily 
have a harder time satisfying detailed demand-letter or pre-investigation 
requirements, either because the merits of their claims cannot live up to 
those requirements or because the economics do not support it. But 
patent holders that do not rely on those categories of lawsuits can 
relatively easily comply with the requirements and so face 
comparatively smaller obstacles to bringing patent lawsuits. 
The businesses that would be the most effective opponents of state 
anti-patent laws—businesses that have much at stake because they 
depend on patent rights, with experience lobbying state legislatures—do 
not rely on the kinds of patent lawsuits that the state laws target. There 
are two reasons for this. First, the merits of their claims are often 
stronger. Businesses depend on patent rights because they give them 
monopolies over valuable technologies, and those monopolies can be 
worth millions or billions of dollars. But extracting that value requires 
being able to successfully enforce those rights, or competitors will not 
be deterred from entering the market, denying patent holders those 
monopoly profits. A patent holder with a meritorious claim—or even 
one that is reasonably likely to succeed—will have no trouble satisfying 
the demands of state laws targeting “bad faith” infringement claims. 
And second, this kind of patent holder rarely targets small defendants, 
whether small businesses or end users.211 Instead, they target 
businesses—often competitors—selling products and services that 
allegedly infringe the patent.212 There are rarely more than a few dozen 
such companies, though, so the incremental cost of complying with 
state laws is small.213 Since these patent holders do not need to rely on 
sending hundreds or thousands of demand letters, they can take on the 
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incremental cost of identifying, with specificity, how defendants 
allegedly infringe their patents. 
Interest-group advocacy in the states has reflected the limited 
stakes of anti-patent laws for businesses that rely on patent rights. In 
Wisconsin, for instance, the only industry opposition to the bill was 
from BioForward, a Wisconsin biotechnology industry group.214 But 
BioForward’s testimony acknowledged that patent trolls and patent 
holders sending thousands of demand letters were significant problems 
and that large companies relying on patent rights could and should 
comply with reasonable specificity requirements for demand letters.215 
Its principal contentions were that enacting a patchwork of different 
state requirements could have unintended consequences and that 
Congress was considering similar proposals, which would address the 
problem without state intervention and possible preemption.216 And as 
observed above, other industry groups and companies relying on patent 
rights focused their attention on tweaking the bill instead of opposing it 
outright, helping ensure that the bill would be narrowly tailored. 
Because concentrated interest groups with preexisting channels of 
influence in statehouses supported anti-patent laws and agenda setters 
helped push those laws along while opposition was muted at best, states 
have been able to act when the federal government has not. And 
because the state laws help address genuine problems in the federal 
patent system, they may end up doing more good than harm. 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL PATENT SYSTEM AND 
PATENT REFORM 
This assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of state anti-
patent laws has important implications for ongoing debates about patent 
federalism and the patent system as a whole. 
A. Reassessing the Normative Case Against Patent Federalism 
The normative case against patent federalism described earlier in 
this article rests on three problems with giving states more control over 
patent law: that it could upset the balance between innovation and 
competition, could increase compliance costs, and could encourage rent 
seeking by states that disproportionately produce or consume 
innovation.217 The analysis in this article, however, suggests that these 
problems may be exaggerated. 
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First, though it is undoubtedly the case that state laws alter the 
patent system’s balance between innovation and competition—that’s 
why states have passed them in the first place—that may not be a bad 
thing. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the careful 
balance patent law strikes between these competing goals, but the 
institutional analysis above suggests that there are strong reasons to 
doubt that the correct balance has been struck.218 Moreover, the state 
laws are relatively narrowly targeted, disproportionately affecting low-
quality patents and nuisance and end-user litigation.219 Since these are 
portions of the patent system that, most agree, are especially 
problematic, it is relatively straightforward to conclude that the state 
laws might tweak the balance between innovation and competition in 
helpful ways. It is not as if the laws purport to undertake broader 
adjustments, like changing the length of the patent term or the standards 
for what is patentable. 
Second, though markedly diverse state patent laws would 
substantially increase patent holders’ compliance costs, there is no 
evidence of this happening in any widespread way under the state anti-
patent laws. Partly this is because the state laws are mostly consistent 
with one another, so the burden has not been greatly multiplied; as long 
as patent holders include basic information in each demand letter, such 
as the name of the patent holder, the number of each asserted patent, 
and a description of how the recipient allegedly infringes the patent, 
and provides reasonable time to comply with demands, it is probably 
okay under even the most stringent state law. It also stems from the 
nature of the state laws, which principally target patent holders who 
send many demand letters; these are the patent holders for whom the 
compliance burden would be greatest, but that burden is the whole 
point, since these are also the patent holders who most need to be 
deterred. Multiple states converging onto one largely consistent body of 
law is a common pattern in state lawmaking. And so just as the 
Restatements reflect broad consensus in various areas of law, and just 
as trade-secret law is largely consistent from state to state, a body of 
largely consistent state-law limitations on patent holders may be the 
result of these laws. 
Third, though patent federalism could lead to rent seeking by states 
that disproportionately produce or consume innovation, leading to 
systematic distortions in the patent system, there is also no evidence of 
this happening under the state laws that have been passed. One way 
such rent seeking might show up would be if states that most rely on 
patent rights were less likely to enact anti-patent laws. However, there 
has been no correlation between how many patents a state obtains 
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(either total or per capita) and whether it has enacted an anti-patent law; 
states that have enacted laws come in all shapes and sizes, from some 
of the ones that obtain the most patents to some of the ones that obtain 
the fewest.220 Not all patents are equal, of course; it is possible that 
some states produce more valuable patents, and that these states are less 
likely to enact anti-patent laws. I have no reason to believe this is true, 
though the assumption is ripe for further research and testing. It is also 
possible, if states are the easier forum for obtaining favorable 
legislation, that we may start to see interest groups more aggressively 
targeting states. 
All three of these conclusions are subject to an important caveat, 
which is that the minimal downsides observed so far may be a result of 
the limited scope of the anti-patent laws enacted to date. If states could 
go farther in their efforts to change the patent system, then we might 
see greater effects that could exacerbate some of these problems. If 
states were free to change the patent system in broader or deeper ways, 
then the effect on the balance between innovation and competition 
would be more drastically affected; likewise, the burden of complying 
with multiple state laws would be a larger problem. If, for instance, 
each state had the power to grant its own patents,221 then the cost of 
protecting an invention could be much higher than it is under the single 
federal system. Likewise, we might see more efforts to benefit home-
state businesses, whether they rely on patent rights or are burdened by 
them, if the effects were greater. This suggests that the arguments 
against patent federalism have greater or lesser salience depending on 
the specific state laws at issue: the greater the effect a state law has on 
the patent system, or the more it departs from the practice of other 
states or the federal government, the greater the burden to show a need 
for the law. 
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B. Rethinking the Preemption Case Law 
This assessment of patent federalism also has implications for the 
Supreme Court’s and Federal Circuit’s respective analyses of patent 
law’s preemptive effect. 
Experience with state anti-patent laws suggests that the Supreme 
Court’s preemption cases may be too quick to find state laws 
preempted. Since, the Supreme Court has held, federal law does not 
occupy the entire field of patent law, there is room for state laws to 
have an effect on the patent system; only when a state law conflicts 
with federal patent law or stands as an obstacle to the goals of federal 
patent law is the state law preempted.222 The game, then, is in 
determining when a state law stands as an obstacle to the goals of 
federal law. And on that question, the Supreme Court has drawn a 
demanding line: state laws are vulnerable whenever they act in a way 
that might change patent law’s balance between innovation and 
competition.223 But the analysis in this Article suggests that the Supreme 
Court’s line may be too strict. The Court has repeatedly emphasized the 
careful balance federal patent law strikes between competing objectives, 
but the analysis in this article suggests that state tweaks to that balance 
can further the system’s ultimate goal of encouraging both innovation 
and competition. 
Though it involved a state law providing additional patent-like 
protections instead of a law limiting federal protections, the Court’s 
Bonito Boats case is an instructive example of the aggressive nature of 
its preemption doctrine.224 Although the Court found that Florida’s 
protection for boat-hull designs upset federal patent law’s careful 
balance of incentives, there are reasons to suggest that Florida had 
identified a real problem.225 And Congress eventually agreed, passing 
the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act nine years later as part of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act.226 The Supreme Court’s preemption 
decision, then, protected a “careful balance” that turned out to be 
anything but.227 In that particular case, Congress solved the problem, 
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though only after a nine-year delay, and only because in the specific 
instance of boat hulls, there was no significant interest group opposed 
to the legislation. With broader problems like nuisance litigation and 
patent trolls, of course, the public-choice obstacles to federal legislation 
are much greater. 
This experience with state anti-patent laws also suggests that the 
Federal Circuit’s preemption cases may be too demanding. Those cases 
permit state laws to survive preemption analysis only when they require 
both objective and subjective bad faith on the part of patent holders, but 
experience with the state laws shows that that requirement accounts for 
a small fraction of troubling patent assertions. These requirements rule 
out, for instance, any effort to regulate letters demanding excessive 
royalties, or providing inadequate information about the asserted 
patents, or giving inadequate time to respond, or falsely threatening 
suit. But all these practices are troubling because they let patent holders 
extract settlements that can bear little relation to the value of the 
asserted patents. The state laws’ more-expansive view, which considers 
numerous factors in concluding whether a patent holder has committed 
“bad faith,” provides a better model for identifying these problematic 
patent assertions. 
C. Reconsidering Federal Patent Reform 
State efforts to influence and change the patent system can also 
provide both substantive and mechanistic insights that should inform 
federal efforts to reform the patent system. 
On the substantive side, state laws show the importance of 
considering out-of-court behavior by patent holders. Most federal 
reform efforts focus on improving patent quality or on reforming the 
litigation system, but state laws have mostly taken another tack, 
targeting pre-litigation behavior. To some degree, this was necessary, 
since measures targeting pre-litigation behavior are less vulnerable to 
preemption attacks. But the states also recognized a genuine problem 
with information asymmetries that let unscrupulous patent holders 
extract unmerited settlements. By making it harder for patent holders to 
target end users, states can channel meritorious patent litigation into 
cases against manufacturers and competitors, which are less socially 
wasteful than end-user cases; by making it harder to bring nuisance 
cases, states can channel unmeritorious litigation out of the system 
entirely. And to the extent these measures are successful, they can 
reduce the incentive to obtain low-quality patents, helping to address 
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the patent-quality critique.228 These out-of-court measures, then, may be 
an important component of effective patent reforms. 
On the mechanistic side, however, this analysis shows that the 
federal government may be ill-suited to adopt these reforms. 
Policymakers and scholars have proposed that the federal government 
should borrow ideas from states enacting anti-patent laws,229 but the 
public-choice failures in Congress suggest that efforts to enact pre-
litigation reforms may be doomed to failure; just as the America 
Invents Act was watered down by opposition from patent-dependent 
interest groups, reforms that make it harder to enforce patent rights can 
count on similar opposition. And even if reforms were enacted, 
institutional failures in the federal courts suggest that those reforms 
may be watered down. Because states are not subject to these 
constraints, they may be more effective conduits for these reforms. 
Indeed, there is a history of the federal government taking over 
organic state-level reforms and effectively neutralizing them. For 
instance, the CAN-SPAM Act, the federal law that regulates spam 
email, was enacted in response to anti-spam laws enacted in many 
states. The act adopted many of the provisions of those state laws, 
banning forged email headers and deceptive subject lines and requiring 
senders to include contact information and provide opt-out 
mechanisms.230 But it was notably weaker in two ways than some of the 
state laws: its enforcement mechanisms were far more limited, and it 
failed to ban unsolicited commercial email outright, as two states had 
done.231 A Senate committee report explained that a uniform national 
standard was important because email is interstate in nature and because 
an email address does not reveal the holder’s location, making it hard 
to comply with different state laws.232 But the report also made clear 
why spam would not be banned, distinguishing “fraud and deception in 
e-mail” as “behavior that a legitimate business trying to comply with 
relevant laws would not be engaging in anyway.”233 If Congress 
concluded that non-fraudulent, but unsolicited, email was a tool that a 
legitimate business might use, then state laws banning it would go too 
far. State lawmakers were less likely to come to that conclusion for 
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many of the same reasons state lawmakers are more likely to want to 
limit patent enforcement: because businesses relying heavily on email 
were more likely to be national or international in scale, while 
individuals who would enjoy greater protections under state laws had 
comparatively greater power at the statehouse level. 
To be sure, state experiences with anti-patent laws can help inform 
federal patent reform. But those experiences suggest that relying 
exclusively on federal law to reform the patent system is unlikely to 
work, and that states are well-positioned to play a helpful role. 
CONCLUSION 
After many decades of exclusive federal control over the patent 
law, states have started asserting themselves in ways that may threaten 
the uniform federal patent system. There are strong reasons to be 
concerned about this development, since it threatens to increase costs 
and reduce the incentives the patent system creates to develop 
innovative new technologies. And yet, as this Article has pointed out, 
there are also reasons to give this development a second glance. These 
laws respond to real problems in the federal patent system, problems 
which that system has been largely unable to address. And while the 
states have their own problems, those problems happen to offset the 
ones in the federal system. The result, then, may be a system that is 
better than a purely federal system not in spite of, but because of, the 
states’ flaws. State efforts to affect the patent system, then, may reflect 
a second-best option for achieving effective patent reform. 
 
